Foreign Aid, Remittances and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (2007-  
2018)  
*S. O. Falana, S. D. Salako, S. M. Akinsanya, L. O. Awoyinka, A. Salaudeen, and O. J. Adewoye  
Department of Economics, Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta (FUNAAB), P.M.B. 2240,  
Abeokuta, Nigeria.  
Department of Agricultural Economics and Farm Management, FUNAAB.  
The Federal Polytechnic, Ilaro.  
Department of Computer Science, Yaba College of Technology.  
*Corresponding Author  
Received: 23 July 2024; Revised: 31 July 2024; Accepted: 03 August 2024; Published: 10 September  
2024  
ABSTRACT  
This study examined the impact of foreign aid and remittances on poverty in 37 sub-Saharan African countries  
from 2007 to 2018, a region that has received significant aid and remittances over the past 20 years. Key variables  
included Poverty Headcount (%), international remittances, and foreign aid flows. Data were obtained from the  
World Development Indicators, OECD, and the GCIP published by the United Nations. A dynamic panel data  
model was used, estimated with the system-Generalized Method of Moments (sys-GMM). The AR (2) and  
Hansen test statistics supported the model's validity, and a robustness check with Real Household Final  
Consumption Expenditure confirmed the results. The findings indicate that remittances significantly reduce  
poverty in the short run but not in the long run, while foreign aid has an insignificant positive effect. The study  
recommends reducing remittance costs, removing barriers to inflow, and creating a policy environment that  
enhances the effectiveness of aid.  
Keywords: Poverty; Foreign Aid; Remittance.  
INTRODUCTION  
Background to the study  
Poverty, a concept which has also been conceptualized as deprivation, is a situation whereby an individual is not  
able to satisfy his physical, psychological, and social needs. In the world today, out of a population of over 7  
billion, around 10% are deemed to be living in poverty and deprived living below $1.90 per day (The World  
Bank Group, 2018). Countries all over the world in the past have made consistent and concerted efforts, plans,  
and policies towards ensuring the liberation of the society from impoverishment. It may be safe to say that a  
good number of countries who have been successful in their attempts are those referred to as the “developed  
countries” today, while others who have remained unsuccessful are the developing and less-developed countries  
of the day; the efforts have not stopped.  
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has  
prioritized putting an end to poverty in all its forms by 2030 among its developmental goals (World Bank, 2010).  
The reason for this is not far-fetched. Poverty, which is intrinsically linked to welfare, has a large degree of  
bearing on the state and structure of any given economy, ranging from level and quality of human capital,  
productivity levels, socio-cultural advancement, and a host of other important components. Since 1990, the  
World Bank and other international developmental organizations have made significant progress in the efforts  
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to reduce poverty; the number of people living in extreme poverty having been reduced from 1.9 billion in 1990  
to an approximate 736 million in 2015, successfully halving the number of poor in the process. While it must be  
acknowledged that these efforts have yielded positive results, much is still left to be desired.  
Today, while the total number of people living in poverty has reduced, regional poverty level reduction has  
remained uneven. Specific focus shall be given to the Sub-Saharan Africa for the purpose of this study;  
essentially, poverty level in this sub-region is what the study is concerned about. Over the years, the region has  
seen a rise in the number of poor, accounting for more than half of the extremely poor in the world today. Only  
four of the 47 sub-Saharan countries have achieved reduction in poverty headcount (Cape Verde, Mauritania,  
Senegal and South Africa), while about a dozen of them in fact recorded increases in poverty headcount ratio,  
for example, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania showed substantially  
higher number of people living in poverty in 2005 than in 1981 (Hillebrand, 2008). The region infamously boasts  
of around 413million people who live below US$1.90 daily. The use of socio-economic measures such as level  
of education, access to health and health status, life expectancy to capture the different dimensions of poverty  
also underline the welfare severity in the region. The table below gives a clearer insight into the distribution of  
the poor across regions of the world:  
Poverty Headcount Ratio(% Number of poor (in  
of Total Population)  
millions)  
Column1  
World  
Sub-Saharan Africa  
South Asia  
East Asia and Pacific  
Latin America & Carribean  
Europe and Central Asia  
Middle East and North Africa  
10  
41  
12  
2
4
1
736  
408.1  
209.9  
45.7  
24.9  
9.1  
5
21.3  
Table 1 - Poverty Level across Regions. Source: Author (Data obtained from data.worldbank.org)  
Of the various means through which solutions have been sought to the problem of poverty in developing and  
less developed countries, foreign aid, and remittances stand-out. Foreign Aid, the development assistance  
rendered by developed economies to developing and less-developed countries, is typically targeted at improving  
economic outcomes in the recipient countries. The earliest origin of foreign aid can be traced to the famous  
“Marshall Plan”, also known as the “European Recovery Program”, a successful United States-led program  
which was set-up to revive and improve the economies of some Southern and Western European countries after  
the second world war. By 1960, foreign aid had taken a more defined shape, spread beyond Europe and  
particularly targeted at poor or needy countries, with international organizations like the World Bank, IMF and  
United Nations taking over the full role of allocating and determining the qualification for the receipt of global  
aid funds. In the 1970, the United Nations and its member countries agreed to donate 0.7 percent of their Gross  
National Income to global aid fund, however, only Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherland, and Norway  
have been able to donate up to this mark.  
Flow of Official Development Assistance to the Sub-Saharan African between 1990-2015( in million)  
60  
50  
40  
30  
Official  
Development  
20  
10  
0
Assistance  
Figure 1. 1 : ODA Flows to the sub-Saharan Africa  
Today, foreign aid is primarily captured by Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the Organization for  
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). While at this juncture the bold claim that the flow of ODA  
has been responsible for the significant headway made in some regions regarding poverty-alleviation cannot be  
made, reference shall be made to existing relevant empirical works.  
According to Champalimaud, Rui and Gil (2018); Chong, Gradstein and Calderon, (2009), foreign aid by itself  
does not seem to have a significant effect on poverty while for other authors such as Alvi and Senbeta (2014);  
Bahmani-Oskooee and Oyolola (2009); Feeny and McGillivray (2017); Ugwuanyi, Ezeaku and Ibe (2018), aid  
has been established to have substantial positive effect on poverty reduction. In the case of Burnside and Dollar  
(2000), aid has positive effect on poverty reduction only in a good policy environment, while Alvi and Senbeta  
(2011); Yontcheva and Masud (2014) found that multilateral aids and grants - aids provided by non-  
governmental organizations and international organizations - usually have more significant effect on poverty  
level than bilateral aids.  
In addition to foreign aid, remittances, which is defined as the share of income sent home by workers working  
outside their home country, is also one other very important source of foreign capital for most developing  
countries. More specifically, the importance of remittances to households in developing countries cannot be  
overemphasized, as while it may serve as only a complement for some families, it is the lifeline for some others;  
inferring that they are going to be left to starve without it. The flow of remittances to low-income and middle-  
income countries rose by 9.6% in 2018, totalling $529billion from $483billion in the previous year. This trend  
can be attributed to the positive economic growth in the major-sending economies, particularly the United States,  
and renewed remittances outflow from some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Russia (World  
Bank, 2019). By region, South Asia witnessed the highest growth in remittances (12.3% - a total of $137billion  
from $131billion), followed by Europe and Central Asia (11.2% - up to $59billion from $53billion) and the Sub-  
Saharan Africa, the African sub-region witnessing a 9.6% increase to $46billion up from $42billion in 2017, and  
a further rise to $48billion in 2018. By this figure, remittances in the sub-Saharan Africa continue to dwarf  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as the largest source of foreign exchange earnings, more so as FDI inflow  
continues on the downward trend (World Bank, 2019). This revelation beams the focus light of development  
experts and researchers on the effect and various dimensional impacts of remittances on the region. The question  
then arises that apart from serving as a source of consumption income, have remittances played any significant  
effect in the poverty-alleviation drive of the less-developed countries? and through what channels have  
remittances affected the welfare of the recipient households?  
Statement of Research Problem  
Among the sources of capital and foreign exchange earnings for developing countries, international remittances  
and foreign aid are two of the most important (World Bank, 2019; OECD, 2018). The sub-Saharan Africa  
particularly remains one of the recipient regions of the highest amount of foreign aid. These efforts have appeared  
largely ineffective as the region quite contrastingly boasts of the highest level of poverty in the world today. In  
fact, according to the statistics made available by the World Bank (2015), one in every two poor persons in the  
world is from the sub-Saharan Africa. These facts continue to puzzle donors, development experts and  
researchers.  
Quite a number of studies carried out in developed economies such as Alvi and Senbeta (2011), Alvi and  
Senbeta(2014) have proved that aid can be very effective if properly and efficiently utilized, this fact informs  
the importance of investigating the effect of foreign aid on poverty levels in the poverty most-prevalent region,  
the sub-Saharan Africa.  
Also, with regard to foreign exchange earnings, remittances have continuously outperformed Foreign Direct  
Investment in the sub-Saharan African region since 2015 (World Bank, 2019), this is also as there appear to have  
been a decline in the level of Foreign Direct Investment, and as a result drawing attention to the impact of  
remittances on the welfare of the receiving households in the region. Past studies such as Akobeng (2015); Imai  
et al. (2014); Adams (2011); Anyanwu (2010) have found that remittances have negative significant effects on  
poverty levels. Although, Imai et al, (2014) also found that remittances are a source of output shock to the  
receiving economy. In effect, there have been limited facts and contradiction in some cases on the effect of  
foreign aid and remittances on poverty. Moreover, few studies have combined these two sources of capital in the  
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same study. These facts even more prompt the inquiry into how remittances have impacted the living conditions  
of the residents of the sub-Saharan Africa.  
This study therefore seeks to assess the influence and significance of aids and remittances, and whether they  
complement poverty-reduction efforts in the sub-Saharan African region. With the use of most recent data which  
accurately capture the variables in question, and the adoption of the most appropriate econometric methodology,  
the findings from this study will provide insights on what the linkage between these variables are and how to  
best integrate the effect of each one on the explained variable to achieve the desired results.  
This research aims to provide answers to the following questions: (i) What has been the trend of poverty,  
remittances, and foreign aid? (ii) What is the effect of foreign aid on poverty in the sub-Saharan Africa? (iii)  
What is the impact of remittances on poverty in the sub-Saharan Africa?  
Research Objectives  
The broad objective of this study is to determine the impact of foreign aid and remittances on the level of poverty  
in the Sub-Saharan Africa, and the extent and significance of this impact. Specifically, this study seeks to:  
1. Examine the trend and statistical characteristics of the study variables in the region.  
2. Assess the effect of remittances on poverty level in the sub-Saharan Africa.  
3. Investigate the effect of foreign aid on poverty in sub-Saharan Africa.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Review of Basic Concepts  
Foreign Aid  
Foreign Aid itself therefore refers to those material resources, ranging from money, machines, drugs, training,  
and education, etc, which are transferred between countries to achieve an improved economic well-being in the  
recipient economy. As defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), foreign aid, also  
called Official Development Assistance, is government aid designed to promote the economic development and  
welfare of developing countries”(OECD, 2014). Foreign aid may be classified based on form and source. Forms  
of foreign aid range from cash gifts, grants, loans, machinery and in fact human capital, while based on source,  
foreign aid can be classified into bilateral and multilateral aid. Bilateral aid usually involves the direct transfer  
of economic assistance from one country (wealthy) to another (poor). Multilateral aid on the other hand refers  
to aid from international organizations such as the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary  
Fund, pooled by various developed countries.  
Remittances  
Remittances refer to transfers, both in cash and in kind, made by workers abroad to their immediate families,  
relatives, or close friends. While remittances may narrowly refer to international transfers, it is important to note  
that they can also be in form of “intra-country” transfers, where workers in the urban areas and cities send home  
money and other material items to their people in the villages and other rural areas, these are known as “Internal  
remittances”.  
According to the statistics available from the World Bank, international remittances in developing countries have  
been on the rise since 1990, going from US$33 billion in 1990, $70 billion in 2004, $125 billion in 2005, $325  
billion in 2010 to US$372 billion in 2011. In 2018, remittance flows to LMICs reached$529 billion, an increase  
of 9.6 percent over 2017 figures (World Bank, 2019).  
Poverty  
The concept of poverty, which is broad in scope, has been studied extensively and as such there exists a vast  
amount of literature about poverty. In its simplest form, it describes a situation whereby an individual is unable  
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to cater for his basic needs. According to Black (2003), it is the inability to afford an adequate standard of  
consumption. Naraya, Patel, Schafft, Rademacher, & Koch-Schulte (2000) further describe poverty as the lack  
of material well-being, insecurity, social isolation, psychological distress, lack of freedom of choice and action,  
unpredictability, lack of long-term planning horizons because the poor cannot see how to survive in the present,  
low self-confidence and not believing in oneself. Development Economists usually explain poverty in both  
relative and extreme (absolute) terms. Relative poverty measures standard of living in a comparative and  
contemporary context, i.e., measured with respect to the society in which the subject resides, while absolute  
poverty views poverty objectively, measuring poverty in terms of a given level of sustenance that must be always  
met in all societies. One metric for measuring extreme poverty is the use of a ‘Poverty Line’ index, a monetary  
measure of living standard. Currently, an individual is considered extremely poor if he or she lives below the  
$1.9 threshold which is the poverty line defined by the World Bank and other International Development  
Institutions.  
Theoretical Review Keynesian/Liberal Theory of Poverty  
Of all theories of poverty, the Keynesian theory appear to be the most befitting to the subject of this study as it  
looks at poverty as a situation imposed on individuals due to macro-level economic conditions. Liberal theory  
revolves around the idea that not only market distortions, but also broad underdevelopment in its multiple facets  
causes poverty. Meanwhile, Keynesians suggest growth can promote economic development and thus relieve  
poverty, hence further justifying government intervention at the macroeconomic level (via fiscal and monetary  
policy), mainly to tackle involuntary unemployment (Davis & Sanchez-Martinez, 2014). The theory therefore  
subtly points to the fact that an efficient use of aid in pursuance of economic prosperity (growth) will lead to  
economic development and in turn, poverty reduction.  
Prospect Theory of Remittances  
The prospect theory of remittances tries to explain the various rationale behind migrants sending part of their  
income back home to families and has further subdivision:  
The Altruism Hypothesis  
This hypothesis tries to argue that “altruism” is the driving force behind why migrants make remittances.  
Proponents of this hypothesis have argued that family members are naturally always concerned about the welfare  
of one another and therefore will be willing to give-up part of their earnings to make-up for the shortfall in the  
family’s consumption and investment level. In the work of Auguste Comte The Catechism of Positive Religion,  
(1852)”, he submitted that individuals, by moral standards, will be willing to sacrifice their own self-interest for  
the good of others. Individuals under this hypothesis are presumed to expect no material or physical gain in  
return. However, some authors have also argued under the utility view that the individual in fact gets something  
in return in the form of satisfaction.  
Marxian/Radical Theory of Poverty  
Marxian and other radical economists posit that economic growth alone is not sufficient to lift an individual out  
of poverty (in this case relative poverty). This is explained by the fact that members of a particular economic  
class may not at all benefit from overall income growth since the mechanism through which this income growth  
come about does not capture/involve that the economic class/group. This school of thought saw poverty as a  
moral and technical issue, considering an example where the poor are the ones who are usually more adversely  
affected by the efforts of the rich to increase their wealth; increase in number of industries and consequently  
industrial pollution. This perspective effectively shifts focus away from the individual himself to the  
characteristics of the class/group which he belongs to.  
Empirical Review  
Burnside & Dollar (2000) conducted a study seeking to establish the impact of foreign aid on economic growth  
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in 56 developing countries and for six four-year periods (1970-1993). The study adopts the classical OLS  
regression and as well the two-stage least square (2SLS) regression primarily because for endogeneity concerns  
in the OLS regression. The study finds that foreign aid has a positive effect on growth in a good policy  
environment. It also finds that bilateral aid has a strong positive impact on government consumption. We  
estimate separate aid allocation equations for bilateral and multilateral aid and find that it is the former that is  
influenced by the donor interest variables. Multilateral aid is largely a function of income level, population, and  
(good) policy. The study concludes that if donors want to have a large impact on growth and poverty reduction,  
then they should place greater weight on economic policies of recipient-countries.  
Azam, Haseeb, & Samsudin (2016) examined the impact of foreign remittances along with other variables  
(foreign aid, debt, human capital, inflation, and income) on poverty alleviation. The data was collected over 39  
countries and through the period of 1990 and 2014.The methodology adopted is the Panel Fully modified OLS  
(FMOLS). The study finds that increase in income leads to a decrease in poverty. Foreign remittances are found  
to have positive impact on poverty alleviation and statistically significant only for upper middle-income  
countries, with the conclusion that policy makers need to design an appropriate policy to remove overdependence  
on foreign aid and reduce poverty majorly by encouraging remittances inflow.  
Adams & Cuecuecha (2010) studied the impact of international remittances on poverty, household consumption,  
and investment in Indonesia using panel data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (2000-2007). They  
employed a three-stage model to account for selection bias:  
First Stage: A nested logit model with instrumental variables estimated the probability of households receiving  
remittances, using instruments like distance to the nearest rail station, rainfall data (1994-1999), and unexpected  
rainfall in 2000.  
Second Stage: The model, adapted from McFadden & Dubin (1984), estimated selection-corrected household  
spending with and without remittances.  
Third Stage: This stage calculated undifferenced selection terms and fixed effects.  
The study found that international remittances significantly reduce poverty in Indonesia. Specifically, the  
Poverty Head Count and Squared Poverty Gap decreased by 26.7% and 69.9%, respectively, for remittance-  
receiving households compared to those that did not receive remittances in 2007. Additionally, remittance-  
receiving households reduced their marginal expenditures on housing by 39.1%.  
According to Capistrano & Maria (2010), it is possible to classify the economic benefits and detriments of  
foreign remittances and migration into three, the macro (national) economic effect, the community (local) effects  
and the household effects. The provision of foreign exchange earnings, balance of payment improvement and  
improved consumption, savings and investment levels of recipient economies remain the most important benefits  
of international remittances (Cattaneo, 2009; World Bank, 2016) on the national level.  
Another study Maimbo & Ratha (2005) also found that a consequence of a rise in household consumption due  
to remittances is the multiplier effect because this increase in consumption is most likely going to be on domestic  
goods. This increase in demand for locally produced goods will also lead to increased production levels,  
benefiting other households (local producers) in the process and creating job and promoting localized  
development in the remittance-receiving community (Woodruff, 2001). Another possible community-level  
development is the emergence of migrant associations which promote the establishment of new schools, health  
centres and other socially-beneficent services and projects (Nyberg-Sorensen, Hear, & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003).  
On the household level meanwhile, the impacts of remittances are not far-fetched, from raising consumption  
levels of both durable and non-durable goods, improved access to education and healthcare facilities, and in  
some cases, serve as capital to kick-starting a business venture.  
Richard H Adams (2011) assesses the effect of international remittances on economies of developing countries  
by examining over 50 recent literatures; ones who made use of household survey data in their research. The  
study particularly examines the issues with the methodology of each work and uses this to ascertain the strength  
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and weakness of each. The study finds that while international migration is necessary for remittances, it is not  
sufficient, as it has been found from the various household surveys that only about half of international migrants’  
remit, also a substantial number of households receive remittances without any member migrating. The major  
finding of this review is that even though remittances consistently have a positive impact on poverty reduction,  
there are also possible adverse effects in the form of reduced labour supply, education (brain drain) and economic  
growth (productivity).  
Vacaflores (2017) assessed the impact of international remittances on poverty levels and inequality using a  
dataset of 18 Latin countries and covering the period between 2000 and 2013. The data on workers’ remittances  
were obtained from the Central Banks of the countries so studied, while that on poverty and inequality were  
collected from the Socio-economic Database for Latin American and the Caribbean. The methodology used, as  
reported, follows that of (Arellano & Bond, 1991) and (Arellano & Bover, 1995) requiring that independent  
variables are instrumented by their lags. The study found that real GDP per capita, economic performance, higher  
labour force participation and government healthcare expenditures all have negative (beneficial) effect on  
poverty level. However, the effect of official development aid was insignificant while the main variable of  
interest remittances indicate that a 1unit increase in remittances per capita leads to a reduction of 8.2 units in  
poverty rate in the succeeding period.  
Gap in literature  
After reviewing many empirical works on the topic, this study found several shortcomings and aims to address  
them. Some studies used remittances as a ratio of GDP in their models, which can distort results. This study  
proposes using ‘remittances per capita’ instead, arguing that population changes affecting this measure are  
minimal. Additionally, this research will utilize poverty statistics from the Global Consumption and Income  
Project (GCIP) rather than GDP per capita. The study employs recent econometric methods and data to explore  
the relationship between remittances, foreign aid, and poverty, a novel approach with no existing research on  
this exact topic.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Theoretical Framework  
This study is based on the two-gap model of economic growth (McKinnon, 1964), which extends the Harrod-  
Domar model. This theory identifies two main growth constraints for developing countries:  
1. Savings Gap: Domestic savings are insufficient to fund the investment needed for economic growth,  
partly due to low average income levels. To address this, countries often seek foreign capital through  
Foreign Direct Investment, Foreign Portfolio Investment, and Foreign Aid.  
2. Foreign Exchange Gap: Developing countries struggle to import necessary goods due to inadequate  
foreign exchange, resulting from their inability to export enough to achieve a trade surplus and  
accumulate foreign earnings.  
While foreign capital can help bridge these gaps, remittances from migrant workers also serve as a stable source  
of foreign capital, effectively acting as a form of service export.  
Mathematical Derivation of the Two-Gap Model  
Considering the conventional National Accounts Identity:  
= + + (푋 − 푀)  
푌 − 퐶 = + 푋 − 푀  
Recall that savings is defined as that part of income that is unspent:  
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= 푌 − 퐶  
Therefore:  
= + 푋 − 푀  
퐼 − 푆 = 푀 − 푋  
The left-hand side of the identity above captures the savings gap, while the right-hand side captures the foreign  
exchange gap. On basis of the premise that foreign capital can be used to finance domestic investment, (M X)  
= F, where F represents foreign capital. Therefore:  
퐼 − 푆 = 퐹  
= + 푆  
Domestic Savings (S) can thus be complemented by foreign capital (F) to achieve the required level of  
Investment (I).  
Model Specification  
The model adopted in this study follows the basic growth-poverty relationship used in studies such as Alvi &  
Senbeta (2011); Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009); Adams & Page (2005); Ravallion & Chen, (1997); Datt &  
Ravallion (1992) to investigate the impact of remittances and foreign aid on poverty. The baseline specification  
is:  
log 푖푡 = 0 + 1 log 푖푡 + 2 log 푖푡 + 푖푡  
(1)  
where i and t are indices of country and year, respectively,  
Pit is the measure of poverty, Yit is the real per capita income for country i at time t, Git is the Gini coefficient  
for country i at time t, β1 is the growth elasticity of poverty, β2 is the income inequality elasticity of poverty.  
Equation (1) above is then adapted for this purpose of this study by including AIDit (aid per capita in country i  
and at time t) and REMit (remittances per capita in country i and at time t). In order to account for the persistent  
nature of the poverty variable (regressand), its lag Pi,t-1 is included as part of the explanatory variables. Git which  
represents the Gini co-efficient has been found to be used in existing literatures on the a priori basis that higher  
income inequality is accompanied by a higher poverty level, however, due to the unavailability of reliable data  
on this variable across almost all the subjects under study, this variable is dropped. Our new specification  
therefore appears thus:  
푖푡 = ∝ 푃,푡−1 + 1푙표푔푌푖푡 + 2푅퐸푀푖푡 + 3퐴퐼퐷푖푡 +  
푖푡푘+ + + 푖푡  
=1  
Xit is a vector of other control variables such as per capita government expenditure on health, per capita  
government expenditure on education, age dependency ratio, globalization and labour force participation which  
have all been identified in existing literature as important poverty explanatory variables, and εit is the  
idiosyncratic error term.  
The key parameters of interest are β2 and β3, which explain the direct effect of remittances and foreign aid on  
poverty respectively. The total effect of both variables is a sum of their direct and indirect effects. Indirect effects  
of aid could come in the form of improved government policy and institutions while that of remittances maybe  
captured through private investment and expenditure on health and education.  
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Data Sources  
Table 3. 1 - Data Source  
Variable  
Unit  
Source  
Aid per capita  
Constant 2011 US Dollars  
Constant 2017 US Dollars  
Percentage  
OECD Database  
Remittances, per capita  
World Development Indicators  
Poverty  
Indices  
(Poverty  
General Consumption and Income Project  
(GCIP)  
Headcount)  
Per capita GDP  
Constant 2011 US Dollars  
Constant 2011 US Dollars  
World Development Indicators  
World Development Indicators  
Per  
capita,  
government  
expenditure on health  
Per capita, government  
Constant 2011 US Dollars  
World Development Indicators  
expenditure on education  
Age Dependency Ratio  
Globalization  
Constant 2011 US Dollars  
Index  
World Development Indicator  
Gygli et al., 2019 (KOF Globalization Index)  
World Development Indicator  
Labour Force Participation  
Percentage  
Estimation  
There are various methodological issues with our relational model such as endogeneity, simultaneity and reverse  
causation which could be because of the bi-causal relationship between poverty and each of remittances and  
foreign aid. It is important to employ an appropriate econometric approach to side-step this endogeneity issue.  
Also as have been noted earlier, poverty series are known to be persistent, and this is taken care of by including  
its lag in our model. The inclusion of this lagged variable poses an econometric concern. While this introduced  
variable may be uncorrelated with the error term, random and fixed-effects estimates become inconsistent  
because the lagged dependent variable will correlate with the transformed error terms. One possible way to  
handle this problem is to use the instrumental variable approach. The use of lagged explanatory variables as  
instruments helps us address the problem of reverse causality when used with dynamic system Generalized  
Methods of Moments developed by (Blundell & Bond, 1998). From our equation (2) derived above.  
푖푡 = ∝ 푃,푡−1 + 1푙표푔푌푖푡 + 2푅퐸푀푖푡 + 3퐴퐼퐷푖푡 +  
푖푡푘+ + + 푖푡  
=1  
This study has opted to employ a dynamic panel data method to capture issues such as the persistence of our  
dependent variable (poverty headcount), endogeneity, reverse causation, cross-country heterogeneity,  
measurement error and missing values. However, panel data dynamic model specification introduces the  
problem of serial correlation in the residuals. This is important to test for the validity of instruments and has  
implications on the consistency of the estimates. The dynamic system Generalized Methods of Moments (sys-  
GMM) is most suitable for estimation as suggested by (Schmidt-Hebbel et al., 2000). Applying system GMM  
involves transforming the above equation to remove the unobserved country effects and then estimating the  
resulting equation by instrumental variables. Arellano and Bond (1991) derived a GMM estimator for the  
coefficients of such an equation based on first differences, using lagged levels of the dependent variables and  
the predetermined variables (“internal instruments”), and second, taking differences of the strictly exogenous  
explanatory variables. The approach assumes that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced  
idiosyncratic errors. Tests for autocorrelation and Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions are conducted to  
Page 706  
determine the appropriateness of the specification.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Descriptive Statistics  
From the table below, the average value of poverty headcount (PHC) across units and over the scope of study is  
38.78%, implying that approximately 40% of the entire population in Sub-Saharan Africa live below the $1.9  
poverty line. PHC can also be seen to be highest at 88.87% in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2007,  
it may however be said that the country has fairly shaken-off a paltry proportion of this figure, as PHC in DRC  
as of 2015 stood at 70.51%, overtaking countries like Madagascar (78.49%), Burundi (77.11%) and Liberia  
(74.36%). Mauritius, Gabon, Cabo Verde boast the minimum poverty concern as the trio averaged impressive  
of 0.46%, 3.24%, 6.06% respectively, while the DRC, Madagascar, Liberia, Malawi, and Burundi fared worst  
within the same time, with PHC averages of 76.78%, 78.85%, 74.83%, 78.84% and 72.13% respectively. The  
extreme variation in the values may be a pointer to the fact that although located in the same continental region,  
some sub-Saharan countries have recorded and still maintain economic and welfare metrics that are quite  
commendable and may necessitate that future studies classify these countries on this basis for more effective  
study and actionable findings. Household Final Consumption per capita (HFCE) averaged $1,388.887 for the  
entire study period and across all countries - a corresponding $4 per day. The peak of this variable is marked at  
$7252.2 for Mauritius in 2017, with the duo of South Africa and Namibia consistently coming next in ranking  
over the last 7 years of the study. Since this is a measure of welfare, it is not surprising to find that similar set of  
countries Burundi, Niger, DRC, Madagascar, and Mozambique - reported the poorest figures as in the case of  
poverty head count, with averages of $199.67, $255.46, $259.29, $344.86 in that order. The lowest HCFE was  
recorded in Burundi in 2007 and stood at $188.64.  
Aid per Capita (Aid Per Cap) representing per person distribution of Official Development Assistance (ODA)  
was at an average of $43.68 with a maximum value of $472.54 in 2010 in Cabo Verde. A standard deviation  
value of $56.54 indicates the level of disparity in distribution amongst units. A key point to note at this point is  
the negative value of -$97.91 obtained for Seychelles in 2016, this implies that Seychelles had paid back more  
than what is received in aids this however does not include aids it provided to other countries. Angola and  
Nigeria parade the lowest Aid Per Cap figures at $5.31 and $6.47 respectively. The smallness of the value for  
Nigeria may be because of its population as the country remains one of the largest recipients of ODA in sub-  
Saharan Africa.  
Remittances per Capita (Rem Per Cap) is the per head share of income transfers from abroad. Cabo Verde, at  
$445.06 in 2018 has the highest value across units and through-out the period under study, this is chiefly because  
Cabo Verde is known for being deeply rooted in emigration and consequently receives a sizeable number of  
remittances annually. As a matter of fact, citizens in diaspora outnumber the Island’s resident population and  
almost every family has a member or relatives in a foreign country (Claudia, 2018). $0.02 is the minimum value  
for remittances per capita for the study period, obtained in Burundi in 2007. On the average scale, the value of  
remittances was $57.73 and a standard deviation of $81.44 indicates the high level of disparity among the  
regions.  
The average of per capita GDP over the study units and period is $2341.14, with a maximum value of $14385.3  
posted by Seychelles in 2018, and $210.78 obtained in 2018 in Burundi. Generally, Seychelles ($12296.15),  
Gabon ($9172.996) and Mauritius ($8769.58) averaged the highest figures over the study period and on the other  
side of the divide, Burundi ($229.65), Niger ($366.18) and DRC ($368.1) parade the most welfare-poor figures.  
An alarming standard deviation of $2978.03 is a pointer to the great difference in welfare level among the units.  
Age Dependency ratio (Age Dep) for each country did not change for much from the initial year (2007), with  
an average value across units in 2007 standing at 85.12 only marginally improving to approximately 78.9 in  
2018. Overall, the average value stood at 82.176 the least value was 41.28, obtained in Mauritius in 2012, while  
the most burdened population with a value of 111.78 was obtained in Niger in 2016. The low standard variation  
(15.708) further points to the fact that this welfare measure did not improve (or maybe worsen) significantly.  
Page 707  
Globalization (Glob) measures level of interaction and integration with the rest of the world on several indices.  
The higher the value, the more integrated a country is with the rest of the world. The average level of  
globalization stands at 43.17 over the study period and across countries. Mauritius, at 79.33% in 2018 boasts of  
the highest degree of globalization, while Ethiopia at 19.18% in 2007 is the least integrated with the rest of the  
world. Mauritius (73.93%), Seychelles (68.68%) and Namibia (62.06%) are on average, the most globalized  
economies and this is reflected in their standard of living when poverty levels and per capita GDP are considered.  
The three least globalized countries across the study period are Ethiopia (25.95), Dem. Rep. of Congo (28.06%)  
and Sudan (30.19%).  
Labour Force participation rate (Lab For) measures the proportion of the total labour force actively involved in  
productive economic activities a measure of the level of employment. The average level of labour force  
participation stood at 68.49% (of the labour force) through-out the entire study period, with a standard deviation  
of 11.57 indicating that the overall variation is quite minimal. The lowest value was 42.71% obtained in 2007 in  
Comoros, while the overall maximum of 90.34% was obtained in Madagascar in 2010.  
Per capita Government Health and Education Expenditures (PCGHE & PCGEE) tell us the extent of government  
welfare expenditure. It may also be taken as a critical determinant of the level of human capital development.  
PCGHE and PCGEE averaged $59.52 and $84.87 respectively for the entire study period and across countries.  
The standard deviation values of $98.90 and $120.50 is an indicator of the unfortunately high degree of disparity  
in human capital efforts in the sub-Saharan Africa. For example, while the highest per capita government health  
and education expenditures were $486.89 (Seychelles 2018) and $666.19 (Seychelles 2016) respectively, the  
lowest for health in 2018 stood at $4.78(Liberia) and $5.48 (Guinea), while the lowest values for education in  
2016 were $9.99 (Dem. Rep. Congo), $13.42 (Burundi) and $13.84 (The Gambia). The lowest overall figures  
were obtained for health expenditure in Guinea in 2018 at $1.15 and for education the minimum government  
expenditure was $5.89 in the Dem. Rep. of Congo in 2012.  
Table 4. 1 - Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  
Obs.  
Mean  
Std.  
Min.  
Max.  
Prob.  
Prob.  
Deviation  
Value  
Value  
(Skewness)  
(Kurtosis)  
PHC  
430  
384  
443  
440  
443  
444  
442  
432  
279  
384  
280  
38.781  
1388.89  
43.679  
57.731  
2341.14  
82.176  
43.168  
68.4947  
127.862  
59.52  
22.893  
1474.29  
56.564  
81.439  
2978.03  
15.708  
12.68  
0
88.87  
0.5459  
HFCE  
188.64  
-97.91  
0.02  
7252.2  
472.54  
445.06  
14385.3  
111.78  
79.33  
0
0
Aid Per Cap  
Rem Per Cap  
PCGDP  
Age Dep  
Glob  
0
0
0
0
210.78  
41.28  
19.18  
42.71  
4.147  
1.1479  
5.89  
0
0
0
0.0838  
0
0.8145  
Lab For  
PCGWE  
PCGHE  
PCGEE  
11.5708  
204.694  
98.9  
90.34  
0.00375  
0
0
0
0
1146.51  
486.89  
666.19  
0
0
0
84.87  
120.5  
Source: Author’s computation with Stata 14  
Graphical Analysis  
The figure below shows a downward trend over time, an indication that, on average, poverty headcount (PHC)  
Page 708  
has been on the increase over the past decade. Answering the question of how, and through what channels remain  
a key objective of this study.  
Figure 4. 1 - Poverty Headcount  
The trend from this graph indicates that households’ final consumption expenditure has been on a steady rise  
since 2007, with the average value currently standing at $1566.03 compared to $1199.3 in the initial year.  
Figure 4. 2 Household Final Consumption Expenditure  
The trend of per capita aid noticeable from the graph does not follow a single pattern over time, while it is on  
the rise in some years, it can be seen to be falling in some others. It first falls sharply around 2008/2009, possibly  
because of the then global economic recession on even the donors. It rose shortly in 2010 and then went on a  
steady fall until 2016. The average value in then increased and again in 2017 and 2018 accordingly.  
Figure 4. 3 - Foreign Aid per Capita  
Page 709  
Remittances per capita to the sub-Saharan Africa has been on the rise. This may be traced to the continued  
increase in the level in globalization, as well as the favourable immigration policies in Europe and the United  
States both of which receive the highest number of emigrants from the sub-Saharan Africa.  
Figure 4. 4 - Remittances per Capita  
This graph depicts a rising overall level of per capita GDP. While this may not be taken as an outright  
improvement in living standard, it points at a growth in the size of the productive capacity of the region possibly  
due to the trickle-down effect of technological advances in the developed countries.  
Figure 4. 5 - per Capita GDP  
This ratio measures the pressure on the working population, and even though it has been on the downward trend,  
it has not changed for much over the past 10 years. It currently stands at 78.9 from 85.24 in 2007. This figure,  
when compared to those of the European Union (54.92), United States (52.71) and even the Middle East and  
North Africa (55.13), it is still a source of concern as this ratio is still considered high such that it may not allow  
for productive investment of income.  
Figure 4. 6 - Age Dependency Ratio  
Page 710  
It can be seen from the graph below that on average, the sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly integrating with the  
rest of the world. This may be because of the many benefits that have been seen to come with being more open  
to the rest of the world, economically, technologically and in other similar contexts.  
Figure 4. 7 - Globalization  
The graph below depicts the Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR). Starting around 69%, the LFPR shows a  
sharp decline until about 2013, likely reflecting the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. After reaching its lowest  
point near 68.2%, the rate gradually recovers, displaying a steady increase with minor fluctuations from 2013  
onwards. This trend suggests an initial decrease in workforce participation due to economic challenges, followed  
by a gradual improvement in economic conditions leading to increased labour market involvement.  
Figure 4. 8 - Labour Participation Rate  
The graph depicts the trend in per capita government education expenditure (PCGEE) from 2007 to 2018. The  
data shows significant fluctuations over the period. Starting below 70 in 2005, PCGEE rises sharply to over 90  
by 2010. This is followed by a decline and subsequent fluctuations, with notable peaks around 2010 and 2015,  
and a significant dip in 2016. The expenditure demonstrates a volatile pattern, indicating inconsistency in  
government spending on education per capita over the observed years.  
Figure 4. 9 - per Capita Government Education Exp.  
Page 711  
The graph illustrates the trend in per capita government health expenditure (PCGHE) from 2007 to 2018. The y-  
axis shows the mean PCGHE, while the x-axis represents the years. Initially, PCGHE remains relatively stable  
around 40-45 until 2010. After 2010, there is a noticeable upward trend, with expenditures rising steadily to  
around 60 by 2015. Following a slight dip in 2015, the expenditure increases sharply, reaching approximately  
80 by 2018. Overall, the graph shows a significant and consistent rise in government health spending per capita  
over the observed period, indicating increasing investment in healthcare.  
Figure 4. 10 - per Capita Government Health Exp.  
Correlation Analysis  
The table below shows the correlation analysis results among the study variables, indicating the degree of their  
joint movement:  
1. Aid per capita has a weak negative correlation with poverty headcount.  
2. Remittances per capita exhibits a moderate negative correlation with poverty headcount (-0.5349).  
3. Per capita GDP, Government Health Expenditure, and Government Expenditure show strong negative  
correlations with poverty headcount.  
4. Labour force participation rate has a weak negative correlation with poverty headcount.  
5. Age Dependency Ratio (Age Dep) and Globalization (Glob) display strong correlations, with AgeDep  
showing a positive relation and others an inverse correlation.  
In a robustness check using Household Final Consumption Expenditure per capita (HFCE) as a secondary  
dependent variable:  
1. Aid per capita shows a weak positive correlation (0.22).  
2. Remittances per capita and labour force participation ratio have moderate correlations (0.57 and -0.52,  
respectively).  
3. Other explanatory variables show strong positive joint movement with Age Dependency, indicating a  
negative linear relationship.  
High correlations between per capita Government Health Expenditure (PCGHE) and per capita Government  
Education Expenditure (PCGEE) suggest potential multicollinearity. This issue is addressed by combining these  
variables into a new measure: per capita Government Welfare Expenditure (PCGWE).  
Page 712  
Table 4. 2 - Correlation Analysis (Author's compilation using Stata 14)  
Variable  
PH  
C
lHFC  
E
lAidPerC  
ap  
lRemP lPCG  
lPCG  
HE  
lPCGE  
E
AgeDep  
Glob  
LabFor  
erCap  
DP  
PHC  
1
-
lHFCE  
1
0.76  
-
lAidPerCa  
p
0.22  
0.57  
0.98  
0.91  
0.93  
1
0.26  
-
lRemPerC  
ap  
0.38  
0.22  
0.28  
0.26  
1
0.53  
-
lPCGDP  
lPCGHE  
lPCGEE  
0.52  
0.47  
0.52  
1
0.76  
-
0.92  
0.94  
1
0.65  
-
0.95  
1
0.73  
AgeDep  
Glob  
0.62 -0.87  
-0.22  
0.26  
-0.5  
0.58  
-0.82  
0.79  
-0.81  
0.77  
-0.82  
0.79  
1
-
0.82  
-0.78  
1
0.62  
Lab For  
0.45 -0.5  
-0.19  
-0.39  
-0.49  
-0.37  
-0.41  
0.35  
-0.38  
1
Model Estimation  
System GMM estimation results  
From the results below, the lagged value of poverty headcount (PHC L1) is significant at 1%, an indication that  
poverty is persistent in the region and that past levels of poverty is a strong predictor of the current levels of  
poverty. Although the coefficient of per capita GDP carries a negative, it is statistically insignificant at all levels,  
pointing to the fact that per capita GDP may not be a good measure of poverty alleviation progress. The  
coefficient of aid per capita is also not significant, but the positive sign it carries may imply that foreign aid  
received in fact worsens poverty in the region, a fact which conforms to existing arguments against foreign aid,  
one of which is that foreign inflow for government leads to unfavourable government decisions outcome  
(unfavourable for the masses), since the government no longer heavily depend on the taxes of the people and  
feels less accountable to them. Remittances per capita is significant at 10%, and the negative value of the  
coefficient implies that ceteris paribus, increased remittances will reduce poverty headcount in the region, a  
finding generally consistent with most existing literatures such as Adams & Page (2005b); Akobeng (2015);  
Anyanwu & Erhijakpor (2010); Imai et al (2014); Wagle & Devkota (2018) . The coefficients of Age  
dependency, Globalization and Labour force participation rate are all statistically insignificant. For labour  
market participation, this may be interpreted to mean that the structure of the labour market is both inefficient  
and underdeveloped, in the case of globalization, it may be argued that the nature and structure of the sub-  
Saharan Africa economy is such that gains and benefits from increased globalization are not being properly  
exploited and a population structure that is not the best for economic prosperity, yet rigid.  
No of Observations: 251  
Years Dummies: Yes  
Page 713  
Number of Groups: 35  
Number of Instruments: 28  
Table 4. 3 - System GMM Results  
Variable  
PHC L1.  
lPCGDP  
lPCGWE  
lAidPerCap  
lRemPerCap  
AgeDep  
Coefficient  
0.9002657  
-.4662556  
.6419239  
.5411105  
-1.028408  
.0746051  
.0405402  
-.0189853  
Probability Value  
0.000  
0.892  
0.742  
0.552  
0.079  
0.600  
Glob  
0.643  
LabFor  
0.674  
Specification Tests  
From our specification test results, we reject the null hypothesis of first order serially uncorrelated residuals at  
10% as 0.1 > AR (1) > 0.05. The AR (2) statistic indicate that we do not reject the null hypothesis of second  
order serially uncorrelated errors and that the model does not suffer from second-order autocorrelation. The  
Hansen statistic at 0.234 is plausible, and we do not reject the null hypothesis of the overall validity of the  
instruments used.  
Table 4. 4 - Specification Tests  
Test  
Probability Value (p-value)  
AR (1)  
0.094  
0.991  
0.234  
0.000  
AR (2)  
Hansen Statistic  
F-Statistic (1690.56)  
Robustness Checks  
The robustness checks for this study will be conducted in two forms. The first is to specify a dynamic panel data  
model but this time with Household final consumption expenditure per capita (HFCE) as the dependent variable,  
this is as this variable (HFCE) is also a widely accepted measure of welfare. The results are summarized below:  
No of Observations: 217  
Years Dummies: Yes  
Number of Groups: 31  
Number of Instruments: 33  
Table 4. 5 - Robustness Check  
Variable  
HFCE L1.  
lPCGDP  
lPCGWE  
Coefficient  
.7703844  
.1312118  
.0146699  
Probability Value (p-value)  
0.000  
0.222  
0.702  
Page 714  
lAidPerCap  
lRemPerCap  
AgeDep  
-.0199922  
.0337824  
-.0032081  
-.0001606  
.0000651  
0.139  
0.064  
0.052  
0.813  
0.945  
Glob  
LabFor  
While the persistence of Household consumption expenditure per capita is also established, the result also  
indicates that at 10% level of significance, remittances have a positive effect on household final consumption  
per capita while age dependency ratio has a negative effect on household final consumption per capita.  
A second form of robustness check is aimed at checking whether the choice to adopt the system GMM Estimator  
(and not the Difference estimator) is justified. The decision to adopt system GMM was initially informed by the  
fact that we have missing values in our observations. This robustness check follows the approach outlined in (S.  
Bond, Hoeffler, & Temple, 2001). It involves first estimating our dynamic autoregressive model by Pooled OLS  
and Fixed Effect Regressions. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side is then  
harvested, with the coefficient from the Pooled OLS set as an upper bound and that of the Fixed Effect set as a  
lower bound. The Difference GMM estimation is then applied to the model and the coefficient of the lagged  
dependent variable is on the right-hand side is retrieved. This coefficient is then compared to the lower bound  
and upper bound set earlier. Decision rule: if the Difference GMM estimate obtained is close to or below the  
Fixed Effects estimate (Lower boundary), this suggests that this estimate is biased downwards because of weak  
instrumentation and prescribes the use of system GMM. The results are presented below:  
Pooled OLS Regression Result (Biased-upward)  
No of Observations: 228  
Table 4. 6 - Pooled OLS Regression results  
Variable  
PHC L1  
Coefficient  
1.010836  
p-value  
0.000  
Fixed Effects Regression Results (Biased-downward)  
No of Observations: 228  
No of Groups: 35  
Table 4. 7 - Fixed Effect Regression results  
Variable  
PHC L1  
Coefficient  
0.6572379  
p-value  
0.000  
One-Step Difference GMM Results  
No of Observations: 193  
No of Groups: 31  
Table 4. 8 - One-Step Difference GMM Result  
Variable  
PHC L1  
Coefficient  
0. 5846384  
p-value  
0.000  
Page 715  
Two-Step Difference GMM Results  
No of Observations: 193  
Table 4. 9 - Two-Step Difference GMM results  
No of Groups: 31  
Variable  
PHC L1  
Coefficient  
0.5743217  
p-value  
0.000  
Decision  
Since the Difference-GMM coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is below the coefficient obtained from  
the Fixed Effect regression, this is an indication that the coefficient is downward biased possibly due to weak  
instrumentation, and since system GMM allows for introduction of more instruments, improving efficiency in  
the process, the case for system-GMM is made. The decision therefore to use system GMM is hereby justified.  
One final test here involves ensuring that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable obtained from the  
twostep system GMM estimate lies between the upper bound and lower bound set earlier. From the results  
obtained above, the system GMM coefficient (0.9002647) lies between the Pooled OLS regression estimate  
(1.010836) and the Fixed Effect Regression estimate (0.6572379). A credible estimate should lie in or within the  
range of these values, in fact it should be below 1.000 as an estimate above 1.000 imply unstable dynamic, with  
an accelerating divergence away from equilibrium values. According to S. R. Bond, (2002), these bounds provide  
a useful check on results from theoretically superior estimators.  
Long-run GMM Coefficients  
Since our model is a short-run model, it is important to estimate the long run coefficient of the explanatory  
variables whose short run coefficient are statistically significant in order to determine the long-run effect of such  
variable on the dependent variable. For this study, only the long run coefficient of remittances per capita will be  
estimated as it is the only significant variable in the study (apart from the lagged dependent variable). The result  
is presented below:  
Table 4. 10 - Long-run GMM Result  
Variable  
Coefficient  
Std error  
z
p-value  
lRemPerCap  
-10.31148  
9.385789  
-1.10  
0.272  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Summary of Findings  
The results show that remittances have a significant negative effect on poverty in the short run, with a 1%  
increase in remittances per capita leading to approximately a 1.03% reduction in poverty headcount. This  
indicates nearly unit elasticity between remittances per capita and poverty. Foreign aid, however, has no  
significant effect on poverty during the study period.  
In a robustness check using Household Final Consumption Expenditure as the dependent variable, remittances  
showed a positive but inelastic effect, with a 1% increase in remittances per capita resulting in a 0.034% increase  
in expenditure per capita. Foreign aid remained insignificant. Additionally, the age dependency ratio negatively  
affects household consumption, with a 1-unit increase leading to a 0.0032% reduction in expenditure.  
Long-run estimates reveal that the poverty-reducing effect of remittances is not significant over time, suggesting  
that the benefits are short-lived and do not sustain long-term welfare improvements.  
Page 716  
Conclusions  
This study adds to the literature on poverty’s relationship with foreign aid and international remittances. It shows  
that while poverty persists in the region, foreign aid alone does not significantly impact poverty levels. This may  
be due to factors such as political instability, poor governance, corruption, misallocation, and institutional  
weaknesses, which hinder aid effectiveness.  
In contrast, remittances are a promising source of external funding, effectively improving living standards and  
household consumption in the short run. This aligns with previous research such as Adams & Page (2005b);  
Akobeng (2015); Anyanwu & Erhijakpor (2010); Imai et al (2014); Wagle & Devkota (2018), indicating that  
remittances may be even more impactful than reported, as informal remittances can constitute 35%70% of  
formal flows. Unlike development aid, remittances directly benefit recipients. The insignificance of other  
variables might suggest that current policy instruments are not effectively addressing poverty. Factors such as  
inequality in GDP growth distribution, inadequate government spending on health and education, low human  
capital development, fragmented labor markets, and a dependent population structure could contribute to this  
issue.  
Recommendations  
Sequel to results and findings revealed by this study, few useful recommendations shall be made.  
1. Foreign aid can worsen poverty by creating dependency, which undermines local initiatives and  
governance, leading to inefficiencies and corruption. Instead of fostering development, it can perpetuate  
poverty and hinder domestic growth. To address this, foreign aid should focus on building local capacity  
and promoting sustainable development through investments in education, infrastructure, and SMEs.  
Implementing strict accountability and transparency measures will ensure aid effectiveness.  
2. Governments should also implement policies limiting the percentage of aid funds spent on non-essential  
activities, ensuring that funds are used directly for their intended purpose.  
3. A 2017 World Bank report noted that about 9.4% of remittances are used for transfer costs, exceeding  
the 3% UN target. Governments should develop plans to significantly reduce these costs. Lower transfer  
costs will increase remittance receipts, improve living standards, and boost investment opportunities.  
Increased formal remittances will also provide more accurate data on inflows.  
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16. Burnside, C., & Dollar, D. (2000). Aid, Policies and Growth.  
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Carlo  
comparisons.  
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of  
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Page 719  
APPENDIX  
Appendix 1: Preliminary Analysis  
Variable  
Obs  
Mean  
Std. Dev.  
Min  
Max  
PHC  
HFCE  
430 38.78121 22.89301  
384 1388.887 1474.285  
443 43.67986 56.56385  
440 57.73082 81.43902  
443 2341.139 2978.026  
0
88.87  
7252.2  
472.54  
445.06  
188.64  
AidPerCap  
RemPerCapita  
PCGDP  
-
97.91  
.02  
210.78 14385.3  
PCGEE  
PCGHE  
AgeDep  
Glob  
280 84.87225 120.5033  
5.89  
666.19  
384 59.51664 98.89804 1.14799 486.8866  
444 82.17608 15.70847  
442 43.16767 12.67985  
41.28  
19.18  
42.71  
111.78  
79.33  
90.34  
LabFor  
432  
68.4947 11.57082  
PGCWE  
279 127.8619 204.6939 4.14706 1146.512  
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality  
joint  
>
>
Variable  
2
Obs Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi  
>
>
PHC  
430  
384  
443  
440  
443  
280  
384  
444  
442  
432  
279  
0.5459  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0375  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0838  
0.8145  
0.0000  
0.0000  
46.70  
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
0
HFCE  
.
>
>
0
AidPerCap  
0
.
RemPerCapita  
.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.
.
PCGDP  
PCGEE  
PCGHE  
AgeDep  
Glob  
.
36.51  
29.84  
31.96  
.
LabFor  
PGCWE  
Page 720  
PHC  
lHFCE lAidPe~p lRemPe~p lPCGDP lPCGEE lPCGHE AgeDep  
Glob LabFor  
PHC  
lHFCE  
1.0000  
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.7644 1.0000  
lAidPerCap  
lRemPerCap  
lPCGDP  
lPCGEE  
lPCGHE  
AgeDep  
Glob  
0.2559 0.2198 1.0000  
0.5349 0.5734 0.3751 1.0000  
0.7632 0.9816 0.2230 0.5158 1.0000  
0.7278 0.9341 0.2641 0.5205 0.9413 1.0000  
0.6496 0.9055 0.2794 0.4729 0.9171 0.9499 1.0000  
0.6172  
0.6180 0.8203 0.2584 0.5770 0.7917 0.7957 0.7740  
0.4537 0.5036 0.1862 0.3974 0.4875 0.4149 0.3661 0.3531  
-
0.8690  
-
0.2222  
-
0.5025  
-
0.8233  
-
0.8197  
-
0.8114 1.0000  
0.7770 1.0000  
0.3784 1.0000  
-
-
LabFor  
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Appendix 2: Model Estimation  
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM  
Group variable: C_ID  
Time variable : Year  
Number of obs  
Number of groups  
=
=
251  
35  
1
Number of instruments = 28  
Obs per group: min =  
avg =  
max =  
F(20, 34)  
Prob > F  
=
=
1690.56  
0.000  
7.17  
11  
PHC  
Coef.  
Std. Err.  
.084677  
t
P>|t|  
0.000  
[95% Conf. Interval]  
PHC  
L1.  
.9002657  
10.63  
.7281813  
1.07235  
lPCGDP  
lPCGWE  
lAidPerCap  
lRemPerCap  
AgeDep  
Glob  
-
-
-
.4662556  
.6419239  
.5411105  
1.028408  
.0746051  
.0405402  
.0189853  
3.413517  
1.930613  
.9014342  
.567657  
.140767  
.0867595  
.0446716  
-
-
-
0.14  
0.33  
0.60  
1.81  
0.53  
0.47  
0.42  
0.892  
0.742  
0.552  
0.079  
0.600  
0.643  
0.674  
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
7.403358  
3.281553  
1.290824  
2.182026  
.2114679  
.1357764  
.1097688  
6.470846  
4.565401  
2.373045  
.1252094  
.360678  
.2168568  
.0717982  
LabFor  
y_1  
y_2  
0 (omitted)  
-
-
-
-
1.876786  
30.77527  
30.57413  
30.70336  
30.72199  
30.69465  
30.60703  
30.42784  
30.25857  
30.04961  
30.10718  
29.99157  
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.06  
0.05  
0.06  
0.07  
0.06  
0.07  
0.05  
0.08  
0.06  
0.07  
0.06  
0.952  
0.960  
0.954  
0.946  
0.949  
0.943  
0.957  
0.940  
0.953  
0.948  
0.951  
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
64.41965  
63.68007  
64.18116  
64.54046  
64.36062  
64.39499  
63.50291  
63.78608  
62.85831  
63.18064  
62.79343  
60.66608  
60.58814  
60.61233  
60.32872  
60.39746  
60.00696  
60.1707  
y_3  
y_4  
1.545961  
1.784412  
2.105869  
y_5  
y_6  
-1.98158  
y_7  
y_8  
-
-
-
-
-
-
2.194016  
1.666101  
2.293273  
1.790162  
1.995478  
1.843222  
y_9  
y_10  
59.19954  
59.27799  
59.18968  
59.10699  
y_11  
y_12  
_cons  
0 (omitted)  
Warning: Uncorrected two-step standard errors are unreliable.  
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation  
Standard  
FOD.(Glob LabFor y_1 y_2 y_3 y_4 y_5 y_6 y_7 y_8 y_9 y_10 y_11 y_12)  
GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)  
L(2/4).(L.PHC L.lAidPerCap L.AgeDep L.lPCGWE L.lRemPerCap) collapsed  
Instruments for levels equation  
Standard  
Glob LabFor y_1 y_2 y_3 y_4 y_5 y_6 y_7 y_8 y_9 y_10 y_11 y_12  
_cons  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  
-1.68 Pr > z = 0.094  
0.01 Pr > z = 0.991  
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(7)  
(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)  
=
8.35 Prob > chi2 =  
9.27 Prob > chi2 =  
0.303  
0.234  
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(7)  
(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)  
=
Page 721  
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM  
Group variable: C_ID  
Time variable : Year  
Number of obs  
Number of groups  
Obs per group: min =  
=
217  
31  
=
Number of instruments = 33  
F(20, 30)  
Prob > F  
1
= 75809.86  
=
avg =  
max =  
7.00  
11  
0.000  
Coef.  
lHFCE  
Std. Err.  
.1116876  
t
P>|t|  
0.000  
[95% Conf. Interval]  
lHFCE  
L1.  
.7703844  
6.90  
.5422878  
.998481  
lPCGDP  
lPCGWE  
lAidPerCap  
lRemPerCap  
AgeDep  
Glob  
.1312118  
.0146699  
-.0199922  
.0337824  
-.0032081  
-.0001606  
.0000651  
.1051782  
.0379909  
.0131476  
.0175658  
.0015888  
.0006724  
.0009307  
1.25  
0.39  
0.222  
0.702  
0.139  
0.064  
0.052  
0.813  
0.945  
-.0835908  
-.0629179  
-.0468432  
-.0020917  
-.0064529  
-.0015338  
-.0018356  
.3460144  
.0922577  
.0068588  
.0696566  
.0000368  
.0012125  
.0019658  
-1.52  
1.92  
-2.02  
-0.24  
0.07  
LabFor  
y_1  
y_2  
0 (omitted)  
0 (omitted)  
y_3  
y_4  
-.0105744  
.0092095  
.0101174  
.0118876  
.0123415  
.0107317  
.0102828  
.0115556  
.0194963  
.0188824  
.0201863  
.4035176  
-1.15  
0.33  
0.260  
0.745  
0.416  
0.090  
0.534  
0.002  
0.020  
0.061  
0.028  
0.286  
0.051  
-.0293827  
-.0173372  
-.0340927  
-.0468317  
-.0286702  
-.0555652  
-.0520836  
-.0778294  
-.0820485  
-.0631543  
-.0040169  
.008234  
.0239879  
.014463  
.0033254  
-.0098149  
-.0216269  
-.0067531  
-.0345648  
-.0284839  
-.0380126  
-.0434855  
-.0219285  
.820076  
y_5  
y_6  
-0.83  
-1.75  
-0.63  
-3.36  
-2.46  
-1.95  
-2.30  
-1.09  
2.03  
.0035778  
.015164  
y_7  
y_8  
-.0135645  
-.0048843  
.0018041  
-.0049226  
.0192974  
1.644169  
y_9  
y_10  
y_11  
y_12  
_cons  
Warning: Uncorrected two-step standard errors are unreliable.  
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation  
Standard  
FOD.(Glob LabFor y_1 y_2 y_3 y_4 y_5 y_6 y_7 y_8 y_9 y_10 y_11 y_12)  
GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)  
L(3/5).(L.lHFCE L.lAidPerCap L.AgeDep L.lPCGWE L.lRemPerCap) collapsed  
Instruments for levels equation  
Standard  
Glob LabFor y_1 y_2 y_3 y_4 y_5 y_6 y_7 y_8 y_9 y_10 y_11 y_12  
_cons  
GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)  
DL2.(L.lHFCE L.lAidPerCap L.AgeDep L.lPCGWE L.lRemPerCap) collapsed  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  
-1.46 Pr > z = 0.144  
0.65 Pr > z = 0.513  
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)  
(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)  
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)  
(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)  
= 15.62 Prob > chi2 = 0.209  
= 11.26 Prob > chi2 =  
0.506  
Long-run Estimate  
_nl_1:  
(_b[lRemPerCap])/(1-_b[L1.PHC])  
>
>
PHC  
Coef.  
Std. Err.  
z
P>|z|  
[95% Conf. Interva  
l]  
29  
>
>
_nl_1  
-
10.31148 9.385789  
-
1.10 0.272  
-
28.70729  
8.0843  
>
Page 722  
Pooled OLS Regression  
Linear regression  
F(18, 232)  
Prob > F  
R-squared  
=
=
=
1874.75  
0.0000  
0.9807  
Robust  
Std. Err.  
PHC  
Coef.  
t
P>|t|  
[95% Conf. Interval]  
PHC  
L1.  
1.010836  
.0132061  
76.54  
0.000  
0.492  
0.875  
0.724  
0.311  
0.335  
0.718  
0.959  
.9848172  
-.490887  
-.9199064  
-.4063541  
-.1968052  
-.0671661  
-.0814203  
-.0363844  
1.036855  
lPCGDP  
lPCGWE  
lAidPerCap  
lRemPerCap  
AgeDep  
Glob  
.2633881  
-.0680636  
.0890581  
.2092405  
-.0221074  
-.0126133  
-.0009281  
.3828337  
.4323544  
.2514474  
.2060892  
.0228696  
.0349231  
.0179959  
0.69  
-0.16  
0.35  
1.017663  
.7837791  
.5844702  
.6152861  
.0229514  
.0561937  
.0345281  
1.02  
-0.97  
-0.36  
-0.05  
LabFor  
y_1  
y_2  
0 (omitted)  
.0433259  
.6106177  
.5448748  
.8345295  
.7758483  
.9755256  
.4971169  
.4021063  
.241367  
0.07  
0.77  
0.04  
-0.77  
0.15  
-1.02  
-0.25  
-1.49  
1.05  
0.943  
0.439  
0.965  
0.440  
0.877  
0.308  
0.805  
0.137  
0.295  
-1.159739  
-.6515002  
-1.607739  
-2.128939  
-1.771477  
-1.487327  
-.8915195  
-.8361517  
-.2613606  
1.246391  
1.49557  
y_3  
y_4  
y_5  
y_6  
y_7  
y_8  
.422035  
.0364858  
-.6003306  
.1505448  
-.507887  
-.0992728  
-.3606004  
.2984164  
1.680711  
.9282782  
2.072566  
.4715535  
.692974  
y_9  
y_10  
.1149509  
.8581934  
.2841159  
y_11  
y_12  
_cons  
0 (omitted)  
-.0620724 .2590007  
-1.3295 4.868301  
-0.24  
-0.27  
0.811  
0.785  
-.5723664  
-10.92123  
.4482217  
8.26223  
Fixed Effect Regression  
Fixed-effects (within) regression  
Group variable: C_ID  
Number of obs  
Number of groups =  
=
251  
35  
R-sq:  
Obs per group:  
min =  
avg =  
within = 0.7449  
between = 0.8209  
overall = 0.8146  
1
7.2  
11  
max =  
F(18,34)  
Prob > F  
=
=
177.95  
0.0000  
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.5758  
(Std. Err. adjusted for 35 clusters in C_ID)  
Robust  
Std. Err.  
PHC  
Coef.  
t
P>|t|  
0.000  
[95% Conf. Interval]  
PHC  
L1.  
.6572379  
.0611755  
10.74  
.5329143  
.7815616  
lPCGDP  
lPCGWE  
lAidPerCap  
lRemPerCap  
AgeDep  
Glob  
-7.420162  
-.4658635  
.5634851  
-.1846048  
.0349653  
-.0238192  
.7425404  
2.856762  
.5066676  
.7817199  
.4038218  
.0732642  
.0309654  
.1999022  
-2.60  
-0.92  
0.72  
-0.46  
0.48  
0.014  
0.364  
0.476  
0.650  
0.636  
0.447  
0.001  
-13.2258  
-1.495536  
-1.025161  
-1.00527  
-.1139255  
-.0867484  
.3362901  
-1.614523  
.563809  
2.152131  
.6360599  
.1838562  
.03911  
-0.77  
3.71  
LabFor  
y_1  
y_2  
1.148791  
0 (omitted)  
.1524285  
1.253884  
1.083365  
1.084493  
.8455891  
1.375223  
.7725163  
.6552986  
.5312538  
.3276482  
.1771557  
0.12  
0.21  
0.46  
-0.09  
0.45  
0.04  
0.904  
0.834  
0.650  
0.931  
0.658  
0.970  
0.589  
0.622  
0.779  
0.816  
-2.39577  
-1.97333  
2.700627  
2.429994  
2.701185  
1.645026  
3.409878  
1.599332  
1.688887  
.8151237  
.7584652  
.3185801  
y_3  
y_4  
y_5  
y_6  
y_7  
y_8  
y_9  
y_10  
.2283318  
.4972304  
-.073418  
.6150878  
.0293896  
.3571605  
-.2645139  
.092604  
-1.706724  
-1.791862  
-2.179702  
-1.540552  
-.9745664  
-1.344152  
-.5732572  
-.4014674  
0.55  
-0.50  
0.28  
-0.23  
y_11  
y_12  
_cons  
-.0414436  
0 (omitted)  
10.68885 21.70977  
0.49  
0.626  
-33.4307  
54.8084  
sigma_u  
sigma_e  
rho  
11.581078  
2.669346  
.94955348  
(fraction of variance due to u_i)  
.
Page 723  
One step Difference GMM  
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step difference GMM  
Group variable: C_ID  
Number of obs  
Number of groups  
=
=
216  
32  
Time variable : Year  
Number of instruments = 173  
Obs per group: min =  
0
F(20, 32)  
Prob > F  
=
=
377.48  
0.000  
avg =  
max =  
6.75  
10  
Robust  
PHC  
Coef.  
Std. Err.  
t
P>|t|  
0.000  
[95% Conf. Interval]  
PHC  
L1.  
.5846384  
.0769008  
7.60  
.4279965  
.7412803  
lPCGDP  
lPCGWE  
lAidPerCap  
lRemPerCap  
AgeDep  
Glob  
-11.62224  
-.7724813  
1.030282  
-.7102644  
.0817664  
-.0165033  
.7886518  
4.204774  
.8985314  
1.000598  
.5916811  
.1336871  
.0285173  
.2496846  
-2.76  
-0.86  
1.03  
0.009  
0.396  
0.311  
0.239  
0.545  
0.567  
0.003  
-20.18709  
-2.60273  
-1.007868  
-1.915479  
-.1905453  
-.0745911  
.280061  
-3.057397  
1.057767  
3.068433  
.4949505  
.3540781  
.0415844  
1.297243  
-1.20  
0.61  
-0.58  
3.16  
LabFor  
y_1  
0 (omitted)  
y_2  
-2.119235  
1.014624  
.9350612  
.9587507  
1.029996  
.7343794  
.4447819  
.5635612  
.6293824  
.8807948  
.9856275  
1.195189  
-2.09  
-2.18  
-1.66  
-1.83  
-1.45  
-3.52  
-1.92  
-2.83  
-1.64  
-1.40  
-1.00  
0.045  
0.036  
0.107  
0.076  
0.157  
0.001  
0.064  
0.008  
0.111  
0.171  
0.323  
-4.185957  
-3.947667  
-3.541608  
-3.985007  
-2.561383  
-2.471283  
-2.228907  
-3.063614  
-3.237787  
-3.387595  
-3.634583  
-.0525129  
-.1383523  
.3642148  
.2110596  
.4303806  
-.6593006  
.0669661  
-.499594  
.3504539  
.6277202  
1.234455  
y_3  
-2.04301  
-1.588696  
-1.886974  
-1.065501  
-1.565292  
-1.08097  
y_4  
y_5  
y_6  
y_7  
y_8  
y_9  
-1.781604  
-1.443667  
-1.379937  
-1.200064  
y_10  
y_11  
y_12  
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation  
Standard  
FOD.(Glob LabFor y_1 y_2 y_3 y_4 y_5 y_6 y_7 y_8 y_9 y_10 y_11 y_12)  
GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)  
L(1/11).(L.PHC L.lAidPerCap L.AgeDep L.lPCGWE L.lRemPerCap)  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -1.83 Pr > z = 0.067  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  
0.27 Pr > z = 0.790  
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(153) = 154.17 Prob > chi2 = 0.458  
(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)  
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(153) = 14.78 Prob > chi2 = 1.000  
(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)  
Page 724  
Two-step Difference GMM  
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step difference GMM  
Group variable: C_ID  
Number of obs  
Number of groups  
=
=
215  
31  
Time variable : Year  
Number of instruments = 183  
Obs per group: min =  
0
F(20, 31)  
Prob > F  
=
=
1.74  
avg =  
max =  
6.94  
10  
0.081  
Corrected  
Std. Err.  
PHC  
Coef.  
t
P>|t|  
0.004  
[95% Conf. Interval]  
PHC  
L1.  
.5743217  
.1841884  
3.12  
.198667  
.9499765  
lPCGDP  
lPCGEE  
lAidPerCap  
lRemPerCap  
AgeDep  
Glob  
-6.795722  
-1.322357  
.1408178  
-.613049  
-.2000383  
-.0373361  
.4875808  
8.179893  
2.368012  
1.140126  
.7383679  
.2902319  
.0428359  
.4396746  
-0.83  
-0.56  
0.12  
0.412  
0.581  
0.903  
0.413  
0.496  
0.390  
0.276  
-23.47872  
-6.151951  
-2.184485  
-2.11896  
9.88728  
3.507236  
2.466121  
.8928624  
.3918936  
.0500283  
1.384303  
-0.83  
-0.69  
-0.87  
1.11  
-.7919702  
-.1247005  
-.4091414  
LabFor  
y_1  
0 (omitted)  
0 (omitted)  
y_2  
y_3  
.6549307  
.6007843  
1.32327  
1.09  
0.31  
0.284  
0.760  
0.950  
0.732  
0.632  
0.722  
0.476  
0.503  
0.494  
0.521  
-.5703769  
-2.291397  
-3.386677  
-3.55065  
-4.406378  
-4.911969  
-6.376701  
-7.29496  
-8.460301  
-9.514771  
1.880238  
3.106257  
3.602809  
2.520783  
2.716908  
3.440785  
3.046166  
3.654899  
4.17248  
y_4  
.40743  
.108066  
y_5  
1.713518  
1.488451  
1.74632  
0.06  
y_6  
-.5149333  
-.8447347  
-.7355921  
-1.665267  
-1.82003  
-2.14391  
-2.298327  
-0.35  
-0.48  
-0.36  
-0.72  
-0.68  
-0.69  
-0.65  
y_7  
y_8  
2.047732  
2.310077  
2.684429  
3.097008  
3.538317  
y_9  
y_10  
y_11  
y_12  
4.918117  
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation  
Standard  
FOD.(Glob LabFor y_1 y_2 y_3 y_4 y_5 y_6 y_7 y_8 y_9 y_10 y_11 y_12)  
GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)  
L(1/11).(L.PHC L.lAidPerCap L.AgeDep L.lPCGWE L.lRemPerCap)  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -1.51 Pr > z = 0.131  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  
0.31 Pr > z = 0.754  
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(163) = 155.08 Prob > chi2 = 0.659  
(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)  
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(163) = 14.44 Prob > chi2 = 1.000  
(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)  
.
Page 725