INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
Effectiveness of Institutional Anti-Corruption Strategies on  
Prosecution of Corruption Cases in Public Sector in Kenya  
Kiboi Kipkorir Walter1, Dr. Yasin Kuso Ghabon2  
1Maseno university-Kenya  
2University of Kabianga-Kenya  
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.90700048  
Received: 24 June 2025; Accepted: 28 June 2025; Published: 29 July 2025ꢀꢀꢀ  
ABSTRACT  
The effectiveness of institutional anti-corruption strategies in enhancing the prosecution of corruption cases in  
Kenya. It focused on how these strategies influence the capacity of relevant agencies—such as the Ethics and  
Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), and the  
Judiciary—to investigate, charge, and convict offenders. The research explored existing mechanisms,  
institutional challenges, and the perceived outcomes of anti-corruption initiatives, providing insights into their  
impact on governance, public trust, and social justice. The study employed a descriptive research design  
targeting institutional actors directly involved in anti-corruption activities. A total of 600 stakeholders formed  
the target population, with a sample size of 234 respondents selected using Krejcie and Morgan’s formula,  
along with 30 purposively selected key informants. A mixed-methods approach was utilized, involving  
structured questionnaires for quantitative data and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) for qualitative data.  
Quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics, while qualitative data underwent  
thematic analysis and were presented narratively to complement the quantitative results. The study revealed  
that corruption remains a deeply rooted challenge in Kenya, significantly affecting governance, public service  
delivery, and economic development. Despite the presence of institutional frameworks, prosecution of  
corruption is hampered by political interference, poor coordination among agencies, inadequate protection for  
whistleblowers, and weak enforcement of laws. Public perception highlights corruption as a structural and  
moral crisis linked to poverty, inequality, and impunity. The study recommends the establishment of a special  
anti-corruption court and an autonomous investigative police unit under the EACC, free from political  
interference and adequately resourced. Parliament should introduce legislative reforms to include asset  
recovery provisions, reverse the burden of proof in serious corruption cases, and bar convicted individuals  
from public office. Additionally, nationwide civic education campaigns are necessary to shift societal attitudes  
and promote a culture of integrity. Lastly, a continuous monitoring and evaluation framework should be  
adopted to assess the implementation and effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies and to enable timely  
improvements.  
Keywords: Anti-corruption strategies, Capacity building, Governance, Institutional frameworks, Inter-agency  
collaboration, Prosecution of corruption, Prosecutorial agencies, public awareness.  
Background of the study  
Corruption in Kenya has deep historical roots tracing back to the colonial era, where land alienation,  
favoritism, and authoritarian governance created a legacy of impunity and exclusion (Khasoane, 2019). After  
independence in 1963, corruption became institutionalized as political elites captured state resources through  
patronage networks, particularly during the regimes of Presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi  
(Adelabu, 2019). Despite reforms and the creation of anti-corruption bodies like the Ethics and Anti-  
Corruption Commission (EACC), successive governments have struggled to dismantle entrenched corrupt  
systems, making corruption a persistent challenge that undermines governance, development, and public trust  
(Ishikawa, 2019).  
Page 584  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
Corruption remains one of the most pervasive challenges affecting governance, economic development, and  
public trust worldwide. It undermines institutions, distorts markets, and hampers social progress by diverting  
resources meant for public welfare into private hands (Koeswayo et al., 2024). Governments and organizations  
have adopted various institutional anti-corruption strategies aimed at prevention, detection, and prosecution to  
curb this menace. The effectiveness of these strategies, particularly in prosecuting corruption cases, is critical  
to ensuring accountability and restoring public confidence in legal systems (Salihu & Jafari, 2020). Globally,  
countries have witnessed varied success in combating corruption through institutional frameworks. While  
some nations have established robust legal and institutional mechanisms that have led to significant  
convictions and deterrence, others continue to struggle with weak enforcement and impunity (Vian, 2020).  
International bodies such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and Transparency  
International have highlighted the need for stronger prosecution efforts as a key pillar in the fight against  
corruption (Inocencio, 2023). However, despite these efforts, corruption prosecutions often face delays,  
political interference, and lack of resources, weakening the overall impact of anti-corruption strategies  
(7Owusu et al., 2020). The study by Hossan et al (2024) revealed that corruption in Bangladesh operates  
through a deeply rooted and interconnected chain involving government officials, politicians, law enforcement,  
and business entities. It found that systemic weaknesses, lack of accountability, and political interference  
significantly contribute to the persistence of corrupt practices, making anti-corruption efforts largely  
ineffective. The study by Bak (2022) reveals that corruption in Myanmar is widespread and systemic, affecting  
all levels of government and public service delivery. Government agencies like law enforcement, judiciary,  
and public procurement are particularly vulnerable, with limited transparency and accountability mechanisms  
in place. Even with the existing anti-corruption laws and institutions, enforcement remains weak due to  
political interference, lack of independence, and inadequate resources, undermining public trust and hindering  
sustainable development efforts.  
The study by Fagbadebo (2019) found that corruption remains a persistent challenge to accountability in post-  
colonial African states, rooted in weak institutional frameworks, inherited colonial governance structures, and  
the politicization of public offices. Agu et al. (2024) found that weak institutional frameworks, limited  
enforcement of anti-corruption laws, and political interference undermine governance and anti-corruption  
efforts in Nigeria. Tiitmamer and Awolich (2022) established that South Sudan’s persistent poor performance  
in global corruption indices is largely due to weak anti-corruption institutions, lack of political will, limited  
transparency, and systemic impunity. The study by Mudey and Arshad (2025) indicated that widespread  
corruption in Somalia’s public sector significantly undermines good governance by eroding public trust,  
weakening institutional effectiveness, and enabling the misuse of public resources. The study by Waweru et al.  
(2025) found that corruption in Kenya is sustained by complex, informal networks involving politicians, public  
officials, and business elites who manipulate formal systems for personal gain. These networks undermine  
anti-corruption mechanisms by exploiting institutional weaknesses, limiting the effectiveness of regulatory  
bodies. The study highlights that despite the presence of formal anti-corruption frameworks, their  
implementation is often obstructed by political interference, lack of accountability, and entrenched patronage  
systems. The study by Onyango (2021) found that whistleblowing remains a critical yet underutilized tool in  
combating corruption within Kenya’s public administration. The research revealed that while legal frameworks  
and anti-corruption institutions exist, weak protection mechanisms for whistleblowers, fear of retaliation, and  
lack of institutional support significantly hinder reporting. Existing studies often emphasize prevention and  
detection, with insufficient attention to prosecution outcomes and the challenges therein. This research sought  
to fill that gap by critically examining the effectiveness of institutional anti-corruption strategies on the  
prosecution of corruption cases, with a focus on practical outcomes, institutional constraints, and  
recommendations for improving the prosecutorial process in Kenya.  
Statement of the Problem:  
Corruption remains a major impediment to good governance, economic development, and public trust in many  
institutions. Ideally, institutional anti-corruption strategies—such as the establishment of oversight bodies,  
enactment of anti-corruption laws, creation of special courts, and implementation of prosecution guidelines—  
should lead to effective investigation, prosecution, and conviction of corruption offenders. These mechanisms  
are expected to deter corruption, ensure accountability, and promote transparency in public service. However,  
Page 585  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
in practice, the prosecution of corruption cases remains slow, selective, and often unsuccessful. Despite the  
existence of institutional frameworks such as anti-corruption commissions, special prosecution units, and  
judicial reforms, the conviction rates remain low, high-profile cases often stall or are withdrawn, and public  
confidence in the justice system continues to decline. Political interference, weak enforcement, lack of  
resources, and inadequate coordination among institutions have undermined the intended effectiveness of these  
strategies. Several reforms and interventions have been introduced to strengthen anti-corruption efforts, but the  
persistent gap between policy and practice indicates a critical failure in translating strategies into results. This  
calls for a fresh empirical investigation into the effectiveness of current institutional anti-corruption strategies,  
specifically their impact on the prosecution process in Kenya.  
Objective of the study  
The objective of the study is to evaluate the effectiveness of institutional anti-corruption strategies on the  
prosecution of corruption cases in Kenya.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Theoretical Review  
The study is anchored on the principal-Agent Theory, which is rooted in economic and organizational studies.  
This theory explains the relationship between a principal (such as the government or institution) and an agent  
(such as public officials or prosecutors) who is delegated to act on behalf of the principal. According to  
Eisenhardt (1989), the principal-agent relationship is characterized by information asymmetry and differing  
interests, which may lead to challenges in ensuring that the agent acts in the best interest of the principal. In the  
context of anti-corruption strategies, Principal-Agent Theory highlights how institutional frameworks aim to  
reduce the risk of agents engaging in corrupt practices or shirking responsibilities. The theory suggests that  
proper monitoring, incentives, and accountability mechanisms are crucial to align the agent’s behavior with the  
principal’s goals of prosecuting corruption cases effectively. However, the presence of corruption can be  
viewed as a failure in this relationship, where agents exploit information gaps or weak oversight to act  
opportunistically. The understanding of the dynamics of the principal-agent relationship is essential in  
evaluating how institutional anti-corruption strategies influence the success of prosecuting corruption cases in  
Kenya. These strategies are expected to strengthen control mechanisms and reduce information asymmetry,  
thereby improving the effectiveness of prosecution efforts.  
Conceptual Framework  
The conceptual framework shown in Figure 1 hypothesizes the interaction between institutional anti-corruption  
strategies and the prosecution outcomes of corruption cases in Kenya. The framework identifies specific  
institutional mechanisms (such as enforcement capacity, inter-agency collaboration, legal reforms, and public  
reporting mechanisms) as independent variables that influence the effectiveness of prosecuting corruption  
cases (measured through indicators such as conviction rates, case clearance time, and case backlog reduction).  
Independent Variable  
Dependent Variable  
Enforcement capacity  
Inter-agency collaboration  
whistleblower protection  
mechanisms  
Number of successful prosecutions  
Timeliness of case resolution  
Recovery of stolen money and  
assets  
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework  
Empirical Review.  
Corruption remains a systemic challenge across the globe, undermining governance, development, and public  
trust. Johnston (2017) argues that anti-corruption efforts often fail because they do not account for the political  
Page 586  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
and institutional contexts within which corruption is embedded. Similarly, Kuipers (2022) emphasizes that  
international anti-corruption strategies frequently fall short in developing countries due to poor localization and  
weak implementation mechanisms. Suarez (2022) assesses Mexico’s National Anti-Corruption System and  
concludes that while institutional frameworks exist, lack of coordination and entrenched political interests limit  
prosecutorial effectiveness. In Asia, Quah (2021) notes that anti-corruption commissions, like in Bangladesh,  
are often constrained by political control, reducing their autonomy and efficacy. Baker et al. (2019) report  
similar patterns in Cambodia, where anti-corruption institutions serve more as political tools than independent  
bodies for justice.  
Focusing on Africa, Senu (2020) highlights that anti-corruption strategies in sub-Saharan Africa often lack  
sustainability and political will, resulting in minimal impact on actual prosecutions. Hope (2024) presents a  
compelling case of an anti-corruption project in Africa that failed due to internal corruption and inadequate  
oversight. Gray (2021) illustrates how procurement corruption in South Africa continues despite anti-  
corruption mechanisms, due to systemic loopholes and weak enforcement. Likewise, Amadi (2021) links  
Nigeria’s anti-corruption campaign failures to insufficient legal reforms and poor judicial follow-through.  
Kenya presents a complex case. Ishikawa (2019) finds that reforms in Kenya are frequently undermined by  
entrenched corruption networks and elite capture. Waweru et al. (2025) reinforce this, showing how corruption  
networks adapt to bypass institutional controls. Daud (2024) further critiques the effectiveness of Kenyan anti-  
corruption strategies, noting inconsistencies in prosecution outcomes and frequent withdrawal of high-profile  
cases. While the reviewed literature confirms that institutional strategies often fall short due to systemic and  
contextual barriers, there remains a critical gap in understanding how specific prosecutorial outcomes in Kenya  
are influenced by the interplay between institutional design, political dynamics, and operational independence.  
A deeper examination is therefore warranted to assess not just the existence, but the functional effectiveness of  
institutional strategies in securing successful prosecutions of corruption cases in Kenya.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This study adopted a descriptive research design to investigate the effectiveness of institutional anti-corruption  
strategies on the prosecution of corruption cases in Kenya. The focus was on key institutional actors involved  
in anti-corruption efforts, including officials from the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), the  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), the Judiciary, and civil society organizations that  
monitor anti-corruption initiatives. The target population consisted of 600 stakeholders drawn from these  
institutions across Kenya. Using Krejcie and Morgan’s (1970) sample size determination formula, a sample  
size of 234 respondents was selected and 30 key informants were also identified.  
Purposive sampling was employed to ensure that only individuals with direct roles in anti-corruption strategy  
design, implementation, or prosecution were included. The study adopted a mixed-methods approach,  
incorporating both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. Structured questionnaires were used to  
gather quantitative data, while Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted to collect in-depth qualitative  
insights from senior officials and policy experts. Quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive statistics  
(means, frequencies, and percentages), as well as inferential statistics including correlation and regression  
analysis. Qualitative data were subjected to thematic analysis and presented in a narrative format to  
complement quantitative findings.  
To assess the relationship between institutional strategies and prosecution outcomes, a univariate linear  
regression model was applied in the form:  
Y=β0+β1X+ε  
Where:  
Y represents the effectiveness of prosecution of corruption cases,  
X represents institutional anti-corruption strategies, and  
Page 587  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
ε is the error term assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero.  
In this model, Y denotes the effectiveness of prosecution of corruption cases, while X represents the  
institutional anti-corruption strategies employed to combat corruption. The model was instrumental in  
determining the degree to which these institutional strategies influence or contribute to the successful  
prosecution of corruption cases in Kenya. By examining the relationship between these two variables, the  
model provided insights into whether existing anti-corruption frameworks, policies, and institutional  
mechanisms are effectively supporting legal action against corrupt individuals, thereby shedding light on gaps,  
strengths, and areas for policy enhancement in Kenya’s anti-corruption efforts.  
DISCUSSION OF STUDY FINDINGS  
Response Rate  
The study targeted a total of 234 respondents drawn from key institutions involved in the prosecution of  
corruption cases in Kenya. These included officers from the Judiciary, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption  
Commission (EACC), the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), and civil society  
organizations engaged in anti-corruption work. Out of the 234 questionnaires administered, 198 were  
successfully filled and returned, resulting in a response rate of 76%. In addition, 25 participants out of 30  
invited took part in the key informant interviews and Focus Group Discussions, translating to a response rate  
of approximately 84.6%.  
According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), a response rate of 50% and above is considered adequate for  
analysis and reporting. Therefore, the response rates achieved in this study were deemed satisfactory and  
provided a reliable basis for the interpretation of findings. The objective of the study was to assess the  
effectiveness of anti-corruption institutional strategies in enhancing the prosecution of corruption cases. This  
section presents the findings related to institutional anti-corruption strategies, supported by descriptive  
statistics, confirmatory factor analysis, and regression analysis used to determine their impact on successful  
prosecution outcomes.  
Descriptive Statistics of Shared Impact on Anti-Corruption Strategies  
This section presents descriptive statistics comprising measures of central tendency (mean and standard  
deviation), frequency, and percentage distribution of responses to items assessing the shared impact of  
institutional anti-corruption strategies on the prosecution of corruption cases in Kenya. Respondents were  
asked to indicate their level of agreement with a set of statements using a five-point Likert scale ranging from  
“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” The findings on respondents’ perceptions are summarized in Table  
1.  
Table 1: perceptions of the respondents on Institutional Anti-Corruption Strategies.  
Statement  
SD  
(%)  
D
(%)  
NS  
(%)  
A
(%)  
SA  
(%)  
Mean Std.  
Dev  
Corruption cases in Kenya courts are often delayed 11.6  
due to evidence interference and whistleblower  
threats.  
17.2  
19.2  
18.2  
15.2  
5.6  
4.5  
7.6  
4.0  
32.8  
28.8  
29.3  
32.8  
32.8  
34.3  
32.3  
36.9  
3.58  
3.52  
3.51  
3.69  
1.40  
1.46  
1.42  
1.39  
Corruption Prosecution efforts are mostly selective, 13.1  
politically motivated, targeting low-level officials,  
ignoring major perpetrators.  
Anti-corruption institutions (EACC, DCI, ODPP and 12.6  
Courts) lack proper coordination and will to prosecute  
cases effectively.  
The EACC should have a special anti-corruption 11.1  
Page 588  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
police unit for investigation, arrest and prosecution.  
Change in law is needed to shift the burden of proof 12.6  
18.2  
5.1  
30.3  
33.8  
3.55  
1.43  
from accuser  
manipulation.  
to  
accused to  
avoid  
evidence  
There is need to have a distinct court to deal with 12.1  
corruption cases only.  
15.7  
18.2  
16.2  
18.2  
3.5  
4.5  
4.0  
4.5  
31.8  
29.8  
32.8  
30.8  
36.9  
33.8  
36.9  
33.8  
3.66  
3.52  
3.70  
3.55  
1.42  
1.46  
1.37  
1.43  
Convicted individuals should be denied the right to 13.6  
hold public office.  
A “recoup back” policy should guide recovery to 10.1  
ensure timely achievement of objectives.  
Presumption  
of  
innocence  
allows  
room  
for 12.6  
manipulation and distortion in corruption cases.  
Key: SD = Strongly Disagree; D = Disagree; N = Neutral; A = Agree; SA = Strongly Agree  
The findings on respondents’ perceptions of institutional anti-corruption strategies reveal a predominantly  
critical view of the effectiveness, coordination, and fairness of anti-corruption efforts in Kenya. A significant  
proportion (65.6%) of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that corruption cases in Kenyan courts are  
often delayed due to interference with evidence and threats to whistleblowers. This is reflected in the relatively  
high mean score of 3.58 and a standard deviation of 1.40. Such perceptions highlight the risk and vulnerability  
involved in reporting corruption. A key informant stated that “whistleblowers are threatened into silence, and  
sometimes the evidence just disappears mysteriously” (KII-01, 2025). During an FGD, a participant  
commented, “We see cases drag on for years, and nothing is resolved. It’s discouraging” (FGD-01, 2025),  
indicating low public confidence in the judiciary’s independence and efficiency.  
Another major concern among respondents was the perceived political selectivity in corruption prosecutions.  
About 63.1% agreed or strongly agreed that efforts to prosecute corruption are mostly directed at low-level  
officials while major perpetrators are often ignored. This sentiment is reflected in a mean of 3.52 and a  
relatively high standard deviation of 1.46, indicating varied but strong opinions. One FGD participant  
lamented, “The poor suffer while the big fish go untouched. It’s not justice—it’s a show” (FGD-03, 2025). A  
civil society actor echoed this view, saying, “Prosecutions are often used for political settling of scores” (KII-  
03, 2025). Additionally, 61.6% agreed or strongly agreed that anti-corruption institutions such as the EACC,  
DCI, ODPP, and courts lack proper coordination and the will to prosecute effectively, with a mean score of  
3.51. This inefficiency in coordination may explain the lack of successful prosecutions and public  
disillusionment. An interviewee noted, “Each institution shifts blame when a case collapse—there’s no  
synergy” (KII-02, 2025).  
In terms of proposed reforms, respondents expressed strong support for institutional restructuring and legal  
amendments. Notably, 69.7% agreed or strongly agreed that the EACC should have a special anti-corruption  
police unit, reflected in a high mean of 3.69. A similarly high percentage supported the establishment of a  
distinct anti-corruption court (68.7%, mean = 3.66), and a “recoup back” policy for asset recovery (69.7%,  
mean = 3.70), the highest recorded mean with the lowest standard deviation (1.37), suggesting consensus. A  
youth leader observed, “Specialization is key. Let corruption cases be handled by a dedicated court and unit  
with no interference” (KII-04, 2025). There was also significant backing for a legal shift where the burden of  
proof would lie with the accused in corruption cases (64.1%, mean = 3.55), and for barring convicted  
individuals from holding public office (63.6%, mean = 3.52). Respondents felt this would deter corruption and  
restore faith in public institutions. As one FGD participant stated, “Once you’re caught, that should be the end  
of your public service—no second chances” (FGD-04, 2025).  
Lastly, a majority of respondents (64.6%) agreed or strongly agreed that the presumption of innocence is being  
manipulated to delay or distort justice in corruption cases, a perception reflected in the relatively high mean  
score of 3.55. This sentiment was echoed in a focus group discussion, where one participant remarked, “The  
presumption of innocence is important, but in corruption, it’s being abused to create endless delays” (FGD-05,  
Page 589  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
2025), underscoring the growing frustration among citizens regarding the misuse of legal safeguards to protect  
corrupt individuals from timely prosecution. These findings collectively highlight a pressing public demand for  
comprehensive anti-corruption reforms that address both legal loopholes and institutional weaknesses. The  
prevailing consensus among respondents is that unless the current anti-corruption strategies are significantly  
restructured to promote swift justice, credible enforcement mechanisms, and heightened public accountability,  
the broader fight against corruption will continue to be perceived as ineffective, compromised, and  
untrustworthy. The abuse of the presumption of innocence not only undermines public confidence in the  
justice system but also perpetuates a culture of impunity, further eroding the credibility of institutions tasked  
with combating corruption and weakening the moral fabric of governance in the country.  
Table 2: Perceptions on Prosecution of Corruption Cases  
Statement  
SD  
(%)  
D
(%)  
NS  
(%)  
A
(%)  
SA  
(%)  
Mean Std.  
Dev  
Corruption in the management of borrowed funds 14.1  
has contributed to the rising national debt.  
20.2  
17.2  
17.2  
17.2  
18.2  
17.2  
17.2  
6.1  
6.1  
4.0  
5.6  
5.6  
5.6  
3.5  
28.3  
32.3  
32.8  
31.3  
30.3  
31.8  
29.8  
31.3  
33.3  
35.4  
34.8  
32.8  
34.8  
36.4  
3.42  
3.60  
3.65  
3.62  
3.52  
3.63  
3.59  
1.46  
1.39  
1.39  
1.40  
1.44  
1.39  
1.45  
Corruption has significantly increased the poverty 11.1  
levels in society.  
Corruption contributes to widening inequality 10.6  
between the rich and the poor.  
Failure to address corruption encourages a culture 11.1  
of impunity in the country.  
Corruption is a major reason for delays in the 13.1  
delivery of essential public services.  
Corruption has eroded public trust in anti- 10.6  
corruption institutions and agencies.  
Corruption results in the denial of basic human 13.1  
rights such as healthcare, education, and clean  
water.  
Corruption has led to the erosion of moral and 11.1  
cultural values in society.  
14.6  
16.2  
18.2  
5.1  
4.0  
4.5  
31.3  
32.8  
30.8  
37.9  
36.9  
33.8  
3.70  
3.70  
3.55  
1.39  
1.37  
1.43  
Many government failures in development and 10.1  
service delivery are linked to corruption.  
Corruption  
enables  
unqualified  
or  
unethical 12.6  
individuals to attain leadership positions.  
Key: SD = Strongly Disagree; D = Disagree; N = Neutral; A = Agree; SA = Strongly Agree  
The findings from the survey reveal deep public concern over the adverse impact of corruption on Kenya’s  
socio-economic development. A substantial majority of respondents (59.6%) agreed or strongly agreed that  
“Corruption in the management of borrowed funds has contributed to the rising national debt,” while 34.3%  
disagreed or strongly disagreed. This suggests that Kenyans associate poor fiscal discipline and misuse of  
public loans with the ballooning debt burden. As one civil society actor noted during an interview (KII-07,  
2025), “We are borrowing in the name of development, but the money is stolen before it reaches the projects.”  
This highlights public frustration over corruption that not only wastes borrowed funds but also places future  
generations in financial jeopardy.  
Similarly, a large portion of respondents (65.6%) believed that “Corruption has significantly increased the  
poverty levels in society.” With a mean score of 3.60, this indicates that the link between corruption and  
poverty is well recognized. One youth respondent during a focus group discussion (FGD-04, 2025) argued that  
Page 590  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
“the resources meant to lift the poor are looted, so poverty becomes permanent.” Closely related is the belief  
that “Corruption contributes to widening inequality between the rich and the poor,” with 68.2% agreeing or  
strongly agreeing and only 27.8% expressing disagreement. This reflects a widely held view that corruption  
benefits the elite and entrenches inequality. The standard deviation of 1.39 for both items underscore the  
consistency of this perception across the sample.  
Another major theme emerging from the data is the normalization of impunity due to unchecked corruption.  
For the item “Failure to address corruption encourages a culture of impunity in the country,” 66.1% of  
respondents expressed agreement, compared to 28.3% who disagreed. A local chief interviewed (KII-09, 2025)  
lamented that “even our children are beginning to believe that stealing is part of success.” This concern was  
echoed in the belief that “Corruption is a major reason for delays in the delivery of essential public services,”  
with a majority (63.1%) acknowledging the link. Delayed infrastructure, understaffed hospitals, and unfulfilled  
development promises were cited in multiple FGDs as visible consequences of corruption.  
Trust in institutions also emerged as a significant casualty of corruption. For the statement “Corruption has  
eroded public trust in anti-corruption institutions and agencies,” 66.6% of respondents agreed or strongly  
agreed. According to a retired public servant (KII-11, 2025), “When EACC is seen dining with suspects, how  
can people believe in justice?” Similarly, the denial of fundamental human rights due to corruption was  
highlighted, with 66.2% agreeing that it deprives citizens of access to healthcare, education, and clean water.  
The impact of corruption extends to social norms, as 69.2% of respondents agreed that “Corruption has led to  
the erosion of moral and cultural values in society.” This suggests a deep societal impact where corruption not  
only distorts the economy but also undermines ethics and values. Finally, the findings show that corruption is  
viewed as a major driver of underdevelopment and poor leadership. A notable 69.7% of respondents agreed  
that “Many government failures in development and service delivery are linked to corruption,” with a mean of  
3.70. Similarly, 64.6% felt that “Corruption enables unqualified or unethical individuals to attain leadership  
positions.” These sentiments reflect a common narrative that corruption derails progress and rewards  
mediocrity. A university student (FGD-06, 2025) summed it up: “In Kenya, you don’t need merit to succeed in  
politics—just money and connections.”  
Application of the findings to principal-agent theory.  
The findings of this study resonate strongly with the principal-agent theory, which posits that public officials  
(agents), entrusted with authority by citizens (principals), may pursue self-serving interests when oversight is  
weak or incentives are misaligned. Respondents’ widespread perception of delayed corruption cases, political  
selectivity, and weak coordination among anti-corruption institutions suggests a systemic breakdown in  
accountability mechanisms, allowing agents to act with impunity. The manipulation of legal principles like the  
presumption of innocence to stall justice, and the shielding of high-level perpetrators, indicate that agents are  
exploiting institutional loopholes to avoid sanction. Public frustration over misuse of borrowed funds, rising  
inequality, and eroded trust reflects the principals' loss of control over their agents, who are expected to  
manage public resources responsibly. The overwhelming support for specialized courts, asset recovery  
mechanisms, and barring corrupt individuals from office demonstrates a collective demand for stronger  
institutional checks and realignment of incentives to compel agents to act in the public interest. Hence, the  
principal-agent theory provides a critical lens to analyze how institutional weaknesses and lack of deterrence  
perpetuate corruption, betray citizen trust, and fuel calls for structural reform.  
Regression Analysis  
The assumptions of using the least square estimator are that the predictor variables should not be highly  
correlated, the error term should be normally distributed (normality) with a constant variance  
(homoscedasticity) and a mean zero and that it should not be highly correlated across the predictor variables  
(serial correlation). These assumptions are tested under this section before running the regression model to  
determine the influence of Institutional Anti-Corruption Strategies on Prosecution of Corruption Cases. One of  
the assumptions of least square regression is that the error term should be normally distributed. This study  
tested for this assumption graphically using P-P plots for regression standardized residual as well as the  
normality plot as shown in figure 2.  
Page 591  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
Figure 2: Normality test of the regression residual  
Figure 2 presents the results of the normality test of the regression residuals using both the Probability-  
Probability (P-P) plot and the normality plot, which visually depicted a bell-shaped curve, suggesting that the  
residuals were approximately normally distributed and thus satisfying the assumption of normality crucial for  
linear regression analysis. The bell-shaped pattern indicated that the residuals were symmetrically distributed  
around the mean, reinforcing the appropriateness of the regression model. In addition to testing for normality,  
the presence of autocorrelation was examined using the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic, with the findings  
displayed in Table 3. The DW value obtained fell within the acceptable threshold of 1.5 to 2.0, which is  
generally considered an indication of the absence of serial correlation in the residuals.  
Page 592  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
Table 3: Durbin Watson test of autocorrelation.  
Model Summaryb  
Mo  
del  
R
R
Squar  
e
Adjust  
Std.  
Change Statistics  
Durbi  
n-  
Wats  
on  
ed  
R
Error  
of the  
Estimat  
e
R
F
df  
1
df2  
Sig.  
F
Cha  
nge  
Square  
Square  
Change  
Change  
1
.268a  
.072  
.067  
.51650  
.072  
15.113  
1
196  
.000  
1.672  
a. Predictors: (Constant), Institutional Anti-Corruption Strategies  
b. Dependent Variable: Prosecution of Corruption Cases  
Source: Survey Data (2025).  
As shown in Table 3, the Durbin-Watson (DW) value of 1.672 falls between 1.5 and 2.0, indicating no  
presence of serial correlation and confirming the suitability of using the least squares estimator regression  
model. Additionally, the assumption of heteroscedasticity was tested using the Breusch-Pagan method, which  
requires a non-significant p-value to uphold the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, with the results presented  
in Table 4.  
Table 4: Breusch Pagan test of heteroscedasticity.  
Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity a, b, c  
Chi-Square  
1.617  
df  
1
Sig.  
.203  
a. Dependent variable: OBJ2  
b. Tests the null hypothesis that the variance of the errors does not depend on the values of  
the independent variables.  
c. Predicted values from design: Intercept + OBJ1  
Source: Survey Data (2025).  
As shown in Table 4, the p-value of 0.203 is greater than 0.05, indicating that the null hypothesis of  
homoscedasticity is upheld, meaning the error term had constant variance as required for regression analysis.  
This justified the use of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model. Having met all assumptions for  
OLS, the study employed a bivariate regression method to examine the nature and strength of the relationship  
between Institutional Anti-Corruption Strategies and the Prosecution of Corruption Cases. The univariate  
regression analysis included the model summary, ANOVA, and regression coefficients. Table 5 presents the R-  
square value, showing the extent to which the independent variable, Ethnic Balance in Public Political  
Appointments, explains the variation in the dependent variable, Prosecution of Corruption Cases.  
Table 5: Model summary  
Model Summaryb  
Change Statistics  
Adjuste Std. Error  
R
d
R of  
the R Square F  
Change  
Sig.  
F Durbin-  
Model R  
Square Square  
Estimate Change  
df1 df2 Change Watson  
1
.268 .072  
.067  
.51650 .072  
15.113  
1
196 .000 1.672  
a
Page 593  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
a. Predictors: (Constant), Institutional Anti-Corruption Strategies  
b. Dependent Variable: Prosecution of Corruption Cases  
Source: Survey Data (2025).  
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that Institutional Anti-Corruption Strategies have a positive  
association with the Prosecution of Corruption Cases, as evidenced by a correlation coefficient of R = 0.268,  
suggesting that enhancements in institutional strategies are moderately linked to improvements in the outcomes  
of prosecuting corruption. This positive relationship implies that as these strategies are strengthened—whether  
through better coordination among institutions, improved investigative capacity, or stronger legal  
frameworks—there is a corresponding increase in the effectiveness of prosecutorial actions. Moreover, the R-  
Square value of 0.072 reveals that Institutional Anti-Corruption Strategies explain approximately 7.2% of the  
variation in the prosecution of corruption cases, indicating that while these strategies contribute to better  
prosecution, a large portion of the variance is influenced by other external or systemic factors such as political  
interference, judicial independence, or resource constraints. To determine the statistical significance and  
appropriateness of the regression model used to examine the relationship between these two variables, an  
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test was carried out, with the results summarized in Table 6, providing further  
insight into whether the observed association is statistically meaningful and not due to chance.  
Table 6: ANOVA (Institutional Anti-Corruption Strategies and Prosecution of Corruption Cases).  
ANOVAa  
Sum  
of  
Model  
1
Squares  
df  
Mean Square F  
Sig.  
Regression 4.032  
1
4.032  
.267  
15.113  
.000b  
Residual  
Total  
52.287  
56.319  
196  
197  
a. Dependent Variable: Prosecution of Corruption Cases  
b. Predictors: (Constant), Institutional Anti-Corruption Strategies  
Source: Survey Data (2025).  
As shown in Table 6, the ANOVA F-test yielded an F-statistic of 15.113 with a p-value of 0.000, indicating  
that the regression model linking Institutional Anti-Corruption Strategies to the Prosecution of Corruption  
Cases was highly significant and a good fit. The significance level (p < 0.05) confirms the model’s validity,  
making any conclusions drawn from it relevant. The corresponding regression model coefficients are presented  
in Table 7.  
Table 7: Model coefficients  
Coefficientsa  
Unstandardized  
Coefficients  
Standardized  
Coefficients  
Model  
1
B
2.727  
Std. Error  
Beta  
t
Sig.  
.000  
.000  
(Constant)  
.227  
.063  
12.003  
3.888  
Institutional  
Anti- .243  
.268  
Corruption Strategies  
a. Dependent Variable: Prosecution of Corruption Cases  
Source: Survey Data (2025).  
Page 594  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
The regression model coefficient results in Table 7 indicate that, holding other factors constant, Institutional  
Anti-Corruption Strategies have a positive and significant effect on the Prosecution of Corruption Cases (β =  
0.243), suggesting that a one-unit improvement in these strategies would lead to a 0.243-unit enhancement in  
Institutional Anti-Corruption Strategies through better handling of corruption prosecutions. The findings from  
this study align with existing literature that critiques the structural inefficiencies and political interferences  
undermining anti-corruption efforts in Kenya and beyond. Scholars such as Johnston (2017) and Kuipers  
(2022) have emphasized that anti-corruption frameworks often fail due to a lack of contextualization,  
institutional fragmentation, and political entrenchment. These concerns are echoed in the perceptions of  
Kenyan respondents, who overwhelmingly viewed prosecutorial outcomes as selective and politicized, with  
63.1% agreeing that low-level officials are often targeted while powerful individuals go free. This supports  
Suarez’s (2022) analysis of Mexico, where formal anti-corruption systems exist but are hamstrung by elite  
capture and poor coordination—issues mirrored in Kenya’s own institutional landscape. Furthermore, the lack  
of coordination among Kenyan agencies like the EACC, DCI, ODPP, and judiciary resonates with Gray’s  
(2021) and Amadi’s (2021) observations that systemic loopholes and weak enforcement mechanisms enable  
corruption to thrive in South Africa and Nigeria, respectively. The strong support among respondents for  
reforms such as specialized courts and units, a reversal of the burden of proof, and barring convicted  
individuals from public office points to a public demand for institutional redesign grounded in legal  
accountability and operational independence. These reform preferences are consistent with Hope’s (2024)  
argument that anti-corruption strategies in Africa must move beyond rhetoric to structural transformation, lest  
they fall into the cycle of institutional decay and public distrust.  
CONCLUSION  
Corruption in Kenya remains a deeply entrenched challenge, with profound implications for governance,  
economic development, social justice, and public trust. The literature and empirical findings demonstrate that  
despite the existence of legal frameworks and institutional mechanisms, the prosecution of corruption cases  
continues to be undermined by systemic weaknesses. These include political interference, lack of coordination  
among anti-corruption agencies, weak protection for whistleblowers, and ineffective enforcement of existing  
laws. The public perceives corruption not only as a moral failing but as a structural problem that contributes to  
poverty, inequality, impunity, and deteriorating public services. These perceptions point to a crisis of  
confidence in state institutions, fueled by selective prosecutions, delayed justice, and a lack of transparency  
and accountability.  
The study also revealed strong public support for a set of legal and institutional reforms aimed at enhancing the  
effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies. Respondents advocated for the creation of a specialized anti-  
corruption court and police unit, reversal of the burden of proof in corruption cases, a "recoup back" policy for  
asset recovery, and permanent disqualification of convicted individuals from public office. These proposals  
reflect a desire for swift and credible justice mechanisms that can overcome the current inefficiencies.  
Furthermore, the public strongly associates corruption with increased national debt, persistent poverty, social  
inequality, and erosion of cultural and moral values. These findings suggest that tackling corruption is not only  
a legal imperative but a societal one, critical to restoring public trust, enhancing development outcomes, and  
safeguarding democratic governance.  
RECOMMENDATIONS  
The government should create a special anti-corruption court and an autonomous investigative police unit  
under the EACC, dedicated exclusively to handling corruption cases. These bodies must be insulated from  
political influence and resourced adequately to carry out independent and efficient investigations and  
prosecutions. Parliament should consider legislative amendments that include a "recoup back" policy for  
recovering assets acquired through corruption, a legal shift in the burden of proof to the accused in serious  
corruption cases, and the disqualification of convicted individuals from holding public office. These changes  
would act as strong deterrents to corrupt practices. Comprehensive public awareness campaigns should be  
undertaken to change societal attitudes toward corruption. Civic education in schools and communities should  
emphasize integrity, accountability, and the rule of law to help rebuild moral and cultural values. A continuous  
Page 595  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
monitoring and evaluation framework should be implemented to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption  
strategies, identify gaps, and recommend timely improvements. This would ensure adaptability and  
responsiveness to evolving corruption dynamics.  
REFERENCES  
1. Adelabu, N. S. G. (2019). An Analysis of Grand Corruption and Anti-Corruption Institutions in Nigeria  
and Kenya; 1960-2015 (Doctoral dissertation, Kenyatta University).  
2. Agu, J. C., Nkwo, F. N., & Eneiga, R. U. (2024). Governance and anti-corruption measures in Nigeria:  
Strategies for enhancing transparency, accountability and public trust. International Journal of  
Economics and Public Policy, 8(1), 1-15.  
3. Amadi, S. (2021). The Failure of Anticorruption Campaign as a Failure of Law Reform in  
Nigeria. Science, Technology & Public Policy, 5(2), 60-68.  
4. Bak, M. (2022). Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Myanmar. Transparency International.  
5. Baker, J., Milne, S., Williams, A., & Schultz, J. (2019). Cambodia’s anti-corruption regime 2008–2018:  
A critical political economy approach.  
6. Daud, Y. M. (2024). A review of effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies and institutions in  
Kenya. African Journal of Commercial Studies, 4(4), 303-318.  
7. Fagbadebo, O. (2019). Corruption and the challenge of accountability in the post-colonial African states:  
A discourse. Journal of African Union Studies.  
8. Gray, N. (2021). When anti-corruption fails: the dynamics of procurement in contemporary South  
Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 48(169), 369-384.  
9. Hope, K. R. (2024). Why anti-corruption projects and programmes fail in some African countries: a case  
study of an anti-corruption project that drowned in corruption and the lessons learned. International  
Journal of Ethics and Systems.  
10. Hossan, M. A., Sourav, A. R., & Islam, J. (2024). Uncovering the chain of corruption: A Case Study in  
Bangladesh. DIROSAT: Journal of Education, Social Sciences & Humanities, 2(3), 246-258.  
11. Inocencio, F. (2023). Anti-corruption Law: Exploring a Global Emerging Norm under the UN  
Convention Against Corruption. Economics, 437, 438.  
12. Ishikawa, Y. (2019). A Critical Analysis of Why Anti-Corruption Reforms in Kenya So Often  
Fail (Doctoral dissertation, University of Sussex).  
13. Johnston, M. (2017). Why Do So Many Anti-Corruption Efforts Fail? In Transnational Financial  
Crime (pp. 263-292). Routledge.  
14. Khasoane, N. C. (2019). Corruption and patronage in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa: an Afrocentric  
ethical critique (Doctoral dissertation, Doctoral dissertation, University of KwaZulu-Natal).  
15. Koeswayo, P. S., Handoyo, S., & Abdul Hasyir, D. (2024). Investigating the relationship between public  
governance and the corruption perception index. Cogent Social Sciences, 10(1), 2342513.  
16. Kuipers, S. (2022). Rethinking anti-corruption efforts in international development. Journal of Financial  
Crime, 29(4), 1370-1381.  
17. Labik Amanquandor, T. D. (2024). Limitations of the international approach to anti-corruption: A  
systematic review of South Africa’s compelling case of failing anti-corruption. Crime, Law and Social  
Change, 82(3), 493-516.  
18. Mudey, M. H., & Arshad, R. (2025). Corruption impedes good governance in Somalia’s public  
sector. Journal of Financial Crime, 32(3), 706-721.  
19. Musila, J. W. (2020). Anticorruption strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from experience and  
ingredients of a successful strategy. In Contemporary Issues and Prospects in Business Development in  
Africa (pp. 26-40). Routledge.  
20. Onyango, G. (2021). Whistleblowing behaviours and anti-corruption approaches in public  
administration in Kenya. Economic and Political Studies, 9(2), 230-254.  
21. Owusu, E. K., Chan, A. P., & Hosseini, M. R. (2020). Impacts of anti-corruption barriers on the efficacy  
of anti-corruption measures in infrastructure projects: Implications for sustainable development. Journal  
of cleaner production, 246, 119078.  
Page 596  
www.rsisinternational.org  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VII July 2025  
22. Quah, J. S. (2021). Patterns of combating corruption in Asia: evaluating the effectiveness of the Anti-  
Corruption Commission in Bangladesh. In Handbook of Development Policy (pp. 485-496). Edward  
Elgar Publishing.  
23. Salihu, H. A., & Jafari, A. (2020). Corruption and anti-corruption strategies in Iran: An overview of the  
preventive, detective and punitive measures. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 23(1), 77-89.  
24. Senu, O. (2020). A critical assessment of anti‐corruption strategies for economic development in  
sub‐Saharan Africa. Development Policy Review, 38(5), 664-681.  
25. Suarez, M. C. C. (2022). The National Anticorruption System in Mexico: Democracy and Efficient  
Governments 2016-2022. Open Journal of Political Science, 12(3), 402-422.  
26. Tiitmamer, N., & Awolich, A. (2022). South Sudan's Anti-Corruption Efforts and Poor Global Ranking.  
Sudd Institute.  
27. Vian, T. (2020). Anti-corruption, transparency and accountability in health: concepts, frameworks, and  
approaches. Global health action, 13(sup1), 1694744.  
28. Waweru, N., Rahaman, A. S., & Garriga Cots, E. (2025). Corruption networks and anti-corruption  
mechanisms: the case of Kenya. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal.  
Page 597  
www.rsisinternational.org