INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (IJRISS)  
ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS | Volume IX Issue VIII August 2025  
State Security Vs Federal Security: The Case of Agunechemba  
Controversy in Anambra State.  
1Emenike, Ekene, 2Achinike Daniel Chimaobim, 3Emenike Adanma Elizabeth  
1Department of Public Administration, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University, Igbariam.  
2Deparment of Public Administration, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu University Igbariam.  
3Department of Education University of Nigeria Nsukka, Enugu State  
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.908000622  
Received: 14 August 2025; Revised: 23 August 2025; Accepted: 27 August 2025; Published: 24  
September 2025  
ABSTRACT  
This paper examines the legal and constitutional implications of the Agunechemba Security Network (ASN), a  
regional security outfit established by the Anambra State Government in 2025 to combat rising insecurity in  
southeastern Nigeria. Drawing on the principles of legal positivism and federalism theory, the study explores  
the tension between Nigeria’s centralized security architecture, enshrined in Section 214 of the 1999  
Constitution, and the increasing demand for decentralized, state-controlled security formations. Through a  
doctrinal legal analysis of the Anambra State Homeland Security Law and comparative references to other  
regional outfits such as Amotekun and Hisbah, the paper identifies constitutional violations, risks to civil  
liberties, and potential threats to national cohesion. The findings reveal that while ASN responds to genuine  
local security needs, it operates outside the bounds of existing constitutional frameworks, raising concerns about  
legality, accountability, and human rights compliance. The paper recommends a structured approach to security  
reform, including constitutional amendment to legalize state policing, a federal regulatory framework for state  
security outfits, stronger human rights safeguards, and increased judicial oversight. Ultimately, the study argues  
that sustainable security in Nigeria requires a recalibrated federal system that aligns legal legitimacy with  
localized effectiveness, rather than reactive regional militarization.  
Keywords: Agunechemba, federalism, state policing, security governance, constitutional law, human rights.  
INTRODUCTION  
Nigeria’s protracted security crises, marked by insurgency, banditry, and widespread kidnappings, have exposed  
the structural limitations of its centralized policing system as established under the 1999 Constitution (Ekhomu,  
2019; Akinola, 2021). In response to the federal government’s waning capacity to maintain law and order across  
the federation, subnational actors have increasingly turned to localized security mechanisms. This trend aligns  
with a growing global discourse on the securitization of subnational governance, wherein local communities  
and state authorities assume quasi-state security functions in reaction to institutional failures (Buzan et al., 1998;  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2022).  
A recent example of this trend is the enactment of the Anambra State Homeland Security Law (2025) and the  
establishment of the Agunechemba Vigilante Group under the administration of Governor Charles Soludo.  
Conceived as a tactical response to rising crime rates, the initiative empowers state-sanctioned vigilantes with  
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broad operational authority, including powers of arrest, detention, and property search without prior judicial  
authorization. These provisions raise significant constitutional and human rights concerns regarding legal  
validity, oversight, and the broader implications for Nigeria’s security governance framework.  
At the heart of the Agunechemba initiative lies the enduring tension between federal supremacy and state  
autonomy in Nigeria’s security architecture. Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) vests exclusive  
control of police and internal security in the federal government (FRN, 1999). However, states facing acute  
insecurity have begun testing the limits of this exclusivity. While the Anambra State government frames  
Agunechemba as a legal and necessary intervention (Soludo, 2025), critics argue it constitutes an extra  
constitutional appropriation of power that may violate the doctrine of “covering the field”, which invalidates  
conflicting state laws where federal legislation already exists (Ozigbo, 2025). This controversy echoes earlier  
debates surrounding regional initiatives such as Amotekun in the Southwest (Ojo, 2020), but Agunechemba's  
broader and more ambiguous mandate places it at the frontier of legal and constitutional scrutiny.  
Legal scholars and civil society actors have expressed concern over provisions such as Article 8(2), which allows  
for detention without prompt judicial review, and Article 12(1), permitting warrantless property searches based  
on “reasonable suspicion” (Global Upfront, 2025). These provisions may conflict with constitutional guarantees  
under Chapter IV of the Nigerian Constitution, including the right to dignity (Section 34), personal liberty  
(Section 35), and privacy (Section 37). Critics warn that in the absence of robust institutional checks, the  
Agunechemba model risks replicating the systemic abuses of earlier security outfits, such as the disbanded SARS  
unit (Amnesty International, 2020), or the unchecked militarism of non-state actors like the Wagner Group in  
global contexts (Reynolds, 2023). While state authorities emphasize built-in safeguards, such as training,  
community liaison mechanisms, and internal oversight (Anambra State Assembly, 2025), these remain untested  
in practice and legally unstandardized.  
This article examines three core legal and policy questions:  
Does the Anambra Homeland Security Law violate Nigeria’s federalist framework, particularly the doctrine of  
separation of powers and the Police Act (2020)?  
To what extent might Agunechemba’s operations contravene civil liberties, and what legal precedents exist from  
similar models such as Hisbah and Amotekun?  
Could the proliferation of such state-based security outfits erode national cohesion and incentivize parallel  
security regimes across other states?  
By examining relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, case law, and comparative examples, this study  
contributes to the growing debate on decentralized security in fragile federations. It argues that while subnational  
security initiatives may provide short-term remedies to insecurity, their long-term legitimacy depends on  
constitutional fidelity, institutional transparency, and meaningful public accountability, factors currently  
underdeveloped in the Agunechemba framework.  
Conceptual Clarification  
State Security  
State security refers to the measures and frameworks instituted by sub-national governments to maintain public  
order, safeguard lives and property, and respond to localized security threats within their jurisdictions. This  
concept, while often contentious in centralized federations like Nigeria, has gained increasing attention due to  
the growing ineffectiveness of federal security forces in addressing community-specific threats (Alemika, 2013;  
Okoli & Orinya, 2013).  
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Historically, Nigerian states have adopted localized security models to mitigate regionally distinct challenges.  
These include the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Borno State combating insurgency; the Hisbah Corps in  
Kano State serving as a religious police; the Amotekun Corps in the South-West created in response to banditry  
and kidnapping; and the Ebubeagu network in the South-East addressing secession-related violence (Ojo, 2022;  
Omisore, 2021). Most recently, Anambra State launched the Agunechemba Security Network, a community-  
based security outfit designed to counter rising violent attacks by non-state actors (Idike & Osakwe, 2022).  
These initiatives often derive justification from the principle of subsidiarity and the need for security structures  
that are culturally attuned, locally embedded, and operationally swift. The theoretical basis lies in responsive  
governance and participatory security, whereby communities take ownership of their safety through state-  
facilitated structures (Ajayi, 2015; Onuigbo, 2021). However, concerns arise when such outfits begin to mirror  
conventional law enforcement agencies—engaging in armed patrols, making arrests, or performing investigative  
roles—which can blur institutional boundaries and provoke constitutional disputes.  
The Agunechemba outfit, for instance, reflects the broader push for localized security governance in the South-  
East but has attracted criticism for its paramilitary appearance, potential political abuse, and perceived lack of  
regulatory clarity (Idike & Osakwe, 2022; Onuoha, 2023). Critics worry that while these formations fill  
operational gaps, they may also deepen fragmentation, encourage militarization of civilian spaces, and lack the  
accountability mechanisms of federal agencies (Ojo, 2022).  
Conceptually, state security embodies the idea of proximity-based protection—security structures tailored to  
local realities, embedded within the socio-political fabric of the state, and responsive to community input. Its  
appeal lies in contextual knowledge and nimble reaction to evolving threats. However, it must be weighed against  
concerns of institutional duplicity, regionalism, and the risk of undermining national unity.  
Federal Security  
Federal security encompasses the nationally coordinated institutions responsible for defending Nigeria’s  
territorial integrity, upholding the rule of law, and ensuring internal cohesion. This includes bodies such as the  
Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the Department of State Services (DSS), the Armed Forces, and the Nigeria Security  
and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), among others (Suberu, 2004; Osaghae & Suberu, 2005).  
The federal security model is rooted in centralized governance, with a top-down command structure, national-  
level intelligence, and uniform enforcement across the federation. Conceptually, it is designed to promote  
cohesion, prevent regional militarization, and create a harmonized internal security system (Akinyemi, 2019). It  
reflects the post-civil war consensus that a fragmented security architecture could threaten the fragile unity of  
the Nigerian state (Nwabueze, 2003).  
Despite its intentions, the centralized model has come under severe criticism for inefficiency, lack of  
adaptability, and poor community relations. Reports of delayed responses, overburdened personnel, and low  
trust in federal agencies are widespread, especially in states facing recurring violence, banditry, or insurgency  
(Aborisade, 2020; Ikeanyibe et al., 2020).  
This discontent has sparked calls for security decentralization and restructuring, not just as a political demand  
but as a governance imperative. Advocates argue that security must be both national and local to be effective—  
national in coordination but local in intelligence, responsiveness, and legitimacy (Onuigbo, 2021).  
Conceptually, federal security promotes uniformity and sovereignty-driven enforcement, but its limitations in  
addressing micro-level threats have made room for alternative state-based security responses. The challenge is  
thus not simply one of capacity, but of conceptual design—balancing centralized legitimacy with decentralized  
adaptability.  
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The conceptual divide between state security and federal security in Nigeria reflects deeper structural and  
philosophical tensions in the country’s federal arrangement. While federal security guarantees national integrity  
and uniform enforcement, state security seeks to respond to immediate local realities. Understanding this  
dichotomy provides essential insight into the Agunechemba case and the broader discourse on federalism, public  
safety, and responsive governance in Nigeria.  
Agunechemba Security Network  
The rise of sub-national security formations in Nigeria reflects growing discontent with the country’s centralized  
policing structure, which has struggled to address escalating insecurity. Although the 1999 Constitution vests  
internal security exclusively in the Nigerian Police Force under Section 214, the increasing inability of federal  
forces to ensure safety across various regions has led to the proliferation of state-level and community-based  
security outfits (Alemika, 2021). Among these is the Agunechemba Security Network (ASN), a state-backed but  
informally structured security arrangement that emerged in the South-East, particularly in Anambra State.  
The name "Agunechemba" is drawn from the Igbo language, connoting "The Lion that Protects the People," and  
symbolizes both cultural pride and the grassroots essence of the initiative. The ASN arose from a growing sense  
of vulnerability in the region, as cases of banditry, kidnapphing, and politically motivated violence surged  
between 2020 and 2022. These developments occurred against the backdrop of national unrest, declining public  
trust in federal security agencies, and increased agitation by secessionist movements, particularly the Indigenous  
People of Biafra (IPOB), whose activities exacerbated the volatility in the South-East (Osumah & Aghedo,  
2022).  
Like similar regional security outfits such as Amotekun in the South-West and Hisbah in parts of the North, the  
ASN was conceived as a local solution to a national problem. However, it differs from these counterparts in key  
respects. While Amotekun is backed by formal legislation in several South-Western states, the legal basis for  
ASN remains ambiguous.  
The primary functions of ASN revolve around intelligence gathering, local surveillance, patrolling, and  
responding to emergencies in collaboration with local stakeholders. Its grassroots orientation is further evidenced  
by its operational strategies, which are often informed by traditional norms and local knowledge. In many  
communities, members of the ASN work alongside traditional rulers, town unions, and age-grade associations,  
reviving the Igbo customary tradition of community self-policing. Historically, Igbo societies maintained order  
through informal institutions such as masquerade societies and communal vigilante groups, which enforced  
social norms and mediated disputes (Onuoha, 2011). The ASN can thus be interpreted as a modern reincarnation  
of these traditional mechanisms, now reshaped by contemporary security challenges.  
The theoretical basis for this kind of local security initiative can be located within the framework of community  
policing and hybrid security governance. Community policing, as described by Skogan and Hartnett (1997),  
involves collaborative efforts between security agents and communities to identify and resolve issues of concern.  
In countries with federal structures like the United States, Canada, and India, decentralized policing is supported  
by constitutional and institutional arrangements. However, Nigeria’s rigidly centralized system lacks such  
enabling provisions, creating friction when sub-national entities like the ASN attempt to fill the vacuum.  
Notwithstanding these challenges, many communities continue to perceive ASN as a necessary and effective  
response to their security needs. Its cultural resonance, proximity to local populations, and responsiveness to  
emergencies have given it a measure of legitimacy, especially in areas neglected by federal forces. Yet, its  
ambiguous legal status, potential for abuse, and implications for Nigeria’s federal structure remain areas of  
significant concern. As such, the Agunechemba Security Network represents both an innovative community-  
based security model and a flashpoint in ongoing debates about state policing and national cohesion.  
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In sum, the ASN underscores the paradox of security governance in Nigeria: the simultaneous necessity and  
contestability of localized security interventions in a centralized constitutional order. As subsequent sections of  
this paper will show, these tensions are not only operational but deeply legal and doctrinal, touching on  
constitutional supremacy, state sovereignty, and civil liberties.  
Overview of Security Challenges in Anambra State  
Anambra State, located in Nigeria’s South-East geopolitical zone, has historically been known for its vibrant  
commerce, intellectual output, and relatively progressive political leadership. However, in the past decade,  
particularly since 2019, the state has experienced mounting security challenges that have disrupted social order,  
threatened investment, and strained the capacity of both federal and state law enforcement agencies. The  
increasing complexity of insecurity in Anambra is a consequence of overlapping threats, including politically  
motivated violence, separatist insurgency, cultism, criminal banditry, and the proliferation of arms.  
Security issues in Anambra are not entirely new. In the early 2000s, the state battled with armed robbery and  
high-profile political thuggery, which peaked during the political crises of 2003–2004, leading to the burning of  
government facilities in Awka and Onitsha (Onwudiwe & Berwind-Dart, 2010). However, recent trends show a  
shift from isolated criminality to a broader and more coordinated pattern of violence, especially following the  
rise of separatist agitation by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and its armed wing, the Eastern Security  
Network (ESN).  
The state has, since 2020, witnessed an increase in attacks on police stations, killings of security personnel, and  
enforcement of so-called “sit-at-home” orders by non-state actors. These developments have severely  
undermined local governance and paralyzed commercial and educational activities, particularly on Mondays  
when the sit-at-home directive is enforced through violent means.  
Several high-profile incidents illustrate the deteriorating security climate in Anambra. On September 26, 2021,  
the convoy of Dr. Chike Akunyili, husband of the late Dora Akunyili (former NAFDAC DG), was attacked by  
gunmen at Nkpor, resulting in his assassination. His killing shocked the nation and drew attention to the rising  
wave of politically motivated violence in the South-East (Punch, 2021).  
In March 2022, Dr. Okechukwu Okoye, a serving member of the Anambra State House of Assembly, was  
abducted and later found beheaded. His severed head was placed in a park in Nnobi, a community in Idemili  
South LGA, reinforcing fears of rising impunity and symbolism in political killings (TheCable, 2022).  
In November 2023, gunmen attacked the police outpost in Oraifite, Ekwusigo LGA, killing four officers and  
razing the building. The attackers were suspected to be part of the armed IPOB/ESN elements enforcing  
secessionist agendas in the region (Vanguard, 2023). Similarly, five police officers and a couple were killed at  
a checkpoint in Umunze, Orumba South LGA, in October 2022. Videos of the attack went viral and revealed  
the brutal efficiency with which the attackers operated, striking and disappearing before security reinforcements  
could arrive (Premium Times, 2022).  
Beyond these targeted attacks, Anambra is also grappling with rampant cult-related violence, particularly in  
Awka, the state capital. Rival cult groups, including the Black Axe (Aiye) and Vikings, have been responsible  
for a spate of assassinations, mostly of young men, during student union elections or local disputes. Between  
January and May 2024, local media reported over 30 cult-related killings in Anambra alone, with Awka and  
Nnewi emerging as flashpoints.  
Another dimension of insecurity is the alarming spread of kidnappings for ransom. The state’s road networks,  
particularly the Onitsha–Owerri Road, Nnewi–Ukpor axis, and Ekwulobia routes, have become notorious for  
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abductions. In many cases, victims are released after payments, while some unlucky individuals are executed,  
especially if they are perceived to be politically or ideologically opposed to separatist groups (BBC News Pidgin,  
2023).  
The presence of illegal arms in the state has further escalated violence. Security agencies have routinely  
discovered caches of firearms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suggesting a growing sophistication  
among non-state actors. The Nigerian Army's raid on a camp in Ihiala LGA in April 2024, which resulted in  
the seizure of automatic weapons and military-grade drones, underscores the high level of militarization of the  
conflict.  
These security challenges have exposed critical weaknesses in Nigeria’s policing architecture, particularly the  
limitations of a centralized command structure in responding to localized threats. The state police command,  
despite its efforts, is often undermanned, under-resourced, and over-stretched. Moreover, inter-agency rivalry  
and lack of synergy between federal forces and local stakeholders have further complicated response strategies.  
The Anambra State Government, under successive administrations, has attempted to address these issues by  
promoting local intelligence gathering, establishing neighborhood watch groups, and supporting vigilante  
services. The controversial emergence of the Agunechemba Security Network is an example of such local  
initiatives, albeit fraught with questions about legality, oversight, and effectiveness.  
The persistent insecurity has led to massive socio-economic dislocations. Many businesses in Onitsha Main  
Market, Nnewi industrial cluster, and Awka have scaled down operations due to extortion, fear of attack, and  
the unpredictability of Monday sit-at-home orders. School attendance has also declined, particularly on  
Mondays, as parents fear for their children’s safety. The brain drain of skilled professionals, especially in  
medicine, academia, and tech, has accelerated as safety becomes a top concern for relocation decisions.  
Anambra's security crisis, though rooted in local dynamics, is deeply embedded in Nigeria’s broader political  
dysfunctions, federal over-centralization, economic despair, ethno-political marginalization, and a failing justice  
system. Without addressing these systemic issues, state-level responses may only achieve temporary relief.  
Doctrinal and Legal Analysis of the Agunechemba Security Network  
The establishment of the Agunechemba Security Network (ASN) by the Anambra State Government has sparked  
a nuanced legal discourse regarding the boundaries of federal and state powers in Nigeria's constitutional  
architecture. Central to this debate is the question of whether a state in Nigeria has the constitutional authority  
to establish a security outfit that exercises paramilitary functions. This analysis is situated within the framework  
of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which unequivocally places the responsibility for internal security,  
defense, and policing under the exclusive legislative list (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999,  
S. 214(1)). Accordingly, the creation of a parallel security structure by a sub-national unit demands rigorous  
legal scrutiny.  
While the Constitution vests policing power in the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), under the command of the  
Inspector General of Police appointed by the President, it also mandates governors as the chief security officers  
of their states (S. 215(4)). This duality has created a structural tension: governors are held politically accountable  
for state security, yet lack operational control over security agencies. It is against this backdrop that the Anambra  
State Government justified the establishment of ASN in 2025, citing the escalation of violence by armed non-  
state actors, targeted assassinations, kidnapping, and the weakening presence of federal forces in rural  
communities (Vanguard, 2025; Premium Times, 2025).  
From a doctrinal standpoint, this raises questions about federal supremacy and the doctrine of covering the field.  
In Attorney-General of Ogun State v. Aberuagba (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 395, the Supreme Court reiterated that  
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where a federal legislation covers a subject in the Exclusive Legislative List, state laws in the same area become  
void to the extent of inconsistency. Applying this logic, any law enabling a state security outfit with coercive or  
prosecutorial powers arguably contravenes Section 214 and the Police Act. Yet, states have continued to explore  
legal innovations to navigate this constitutional constraint. For instance, the legal architecture behind Amotekun  
in the South-West was framed as a "community policing" model backed by enabling laws passed by state houses  
of assembly, but without direct arms-bearing or prosecutorial powers.  
Anambra followed a similar strategy byenacting the Agunechemba Security Law (No. 2 of 2025), which legally  
establishes ASN as a community-based security agency with functions limited to surveillance, intelligence  
gathering, and supporting federal agencies. However, critics argue that ASN's operatives have functioned de  
facto as armed enforcers, conducting patrols, roadblocks, and arrests in some LGAs (Channels TV, 2025). This  
practice raises constitutional alarms, especially in light of Fawehinmi v. Inspector General of Police (2002) 7  
NWLR (Pt. 767) 606, where the court warned against unconstitutional duplication of policing powers.  
Civil liberties implications are also at stake. There have been petitions alleging unlawful detentions and the  
absence of oversight in ASN’s operations, particularly in politically tense communities (CLO Report, 2025).  
Section 35 of the Constitution guarantees personal liberty, and any infringement outside the scope of lawful  
arrest by a recognized law enforcement agency is a violation of this right. Furthermore, ASN's controversial use  
of force in the alleged killing of suspects in Onitsha and Ihiala has prompted calls for a judicial review (Punch,  
2025). The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, domesticated as part of Nigerian law, reinforces  
these protections.  
On the federalism question, scholars like Suberu (2010) and Nwabueze (2003) have long argued that the hyper-  
centralization of Nigeria’s security architecture is incompatible with true federalism. The rise of state-led  
security formations like ASN, Amotekun, and Ebube Agu reflects a growing demand for decentralization of  
internal security. While constitutionally contentious, these developments point to a de facto restructuring in  
response to empirical governance needs.  
Yet, absent a formal constitutional amendment, such innovations remain legally precarious. Until Section 214 is  
revised to allow for state policing, outfits like ASN operate in a grey zone, legitimated by necessity but  
vulnerable to judicial invalidation. A National Assembly bill to create a framework for multi-level policing has  
stalled since 2022, reflecting the political sensitivity of this issue (National Assembly Hansard, 2022).  
In conclusion, while the creation of ASN addresses an urgent security vacuum, it challenges existing  
constitutional and legal boundaries. The courts may ultimately have to resolve whether state security formations  
are lawful under the current framework or whether Nigeria must revisit its security governance model to reflect  
emerging realities.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
This study is anchored on Legal Positivism and Federalism Theory, which together provide a comprehensive  
lens for evaluating the legality and governance implications of state security initiatives like Agunechemba. Legal  
Positivism holds that a law’s validity stems from its conformity with established legal rules rather than moral  
considerations. Drawing on H.L.A. Hart’s “rule of recognition,” the study assesses the Anambra State Homeland  
Security Law in light of the 1999 Constitution—particularly Sections 214 and 215—and the Police Act 2020,  
both of which centralize policing under federal authority. Legal Positivism thus aids in determining whether the  
creation of Agunechemba constitutes an ultra vires act by the state legislature and infringes on the Nigeria Police  
Force’s constitutional monopoly.  
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Federalism Theory, on the other hand, contextualizes Agunechemba within Nigeria’s broader governance  
structure. It emphasizes the constitutional allocation of power between the federal government and subnational  
entities, highlighting the tensions that arise when states attempt to address security failures through local  
enforcement mechanisms. Following Riker’s view of federalism as a negotiated power balance, the theory  
illustrates how outfits like Agunechemba test the limits of state autonomy within a centralized coercive  
framework.  
Together, these theories enable a dual analysis: Legal Positivism assesses constitutionality, while Federalism  
Theory explains the political pressures driving state-level security innovations. This synthesis allows the study  
to critically examine whether Agunechemba represents a legitimate response to local insecurity or a  
constitutional overreach in Nigeria’s federal democracy.  
FINDINGS  
The study through doctrinal review of the Anambra State Homeland Security Law (2025) reveals key  
inconsistencies with Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution and the Police Act (2020), which vest exclusive  
policing powers in the federal government.  
Though politically and socially expedient, ASN’s structure lacks constitutional legitimacy. Its engagement in  
quasi-policing functions, such as armed patrols and detentions, violates the legal bounds of state authority. Like  
similar regional security formations, ASN risks institutional abuse, human rights violations, and challenges to  
federal supremacy. Without formal constitutional backing, its operations pose a threat to judicial safeguards and  
democratic accountability (Suberu, 2004; Nwabueze, 1982).  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The Agunechemba controversy underscores the need for urgent security reforms. While state-led security efforts  
are a response to federal failures, their legal foundations must be consistent with constitutional principles. A  
rights-based, legally coherent, pproach is essential to preserve national unity while enhancing local capacity.  
Recommendations:  
Constitutional Amendment: Initiate reforms to Section 214 to allow for a dual policing system, providing states  
with constitutional authority to maintain local police under clear federal oversight.  
Federal Legal Regulation: The National Assembly should enact a uniform regulatory framework for all state  
security outfits. This should:  
Limit roles to surveillance, intelligence, and liaison duties.  
Prohibit use of force, detentions, and interrogations.  
Require mandatory federal registration and certification.  
Ensure oversight by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA).  
Institutional Human Rights Safeguards: Embed accountability mechanisms including:  
Independent audits and civil society oversight.  
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Disciplinary procedures for misconduct.  
Mandatory human rights training for personnel.  
These measures would help align security decentralization with Nigeria’s constitutional order, ensuring both  
legality and effectiveness in protecting lives and property across all regions.  
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